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Abstract 
During the next few decades the populations of most developed countries will grow older and older as a 
result of the low fertility rates since the 1970s and/or the continuously increasing life expectancy. Poland, 
one of the biggest countries  in Central Europe, will be confronted rather seriously  by this development. 
Generational Accounting which was introduced in the early nineties, can illustrate the effects of this ageing 
process  on  a  country’s  fiscal  situation.  We  show  that  the  demographic  development  produces  a  major 
problem for the long term stability of Polish public finances. In particular the healthcare system deserves 
special attention for policy makers in the medium and long run, whilst the general pension system shall 
stabilise in the long term. 
 
Key words: Generational Accounting, Fiscal sustainability, Fiscal policy, Poland, Pension reform 
JEL Classification: H50, H55, H60, H68, J10, H30 
 
* We would like to thank Tomasz J drzejowicz, Grzegorz Kula, Iga Magda, Joanna Stachura, Pawe  Strzelecki, Izabela Tomczyk, 
Anna Wronka, Arne Leifels, Christian Hagist, Jasmin Häcker, Stefan Moog and Johannes Vatter for valuable comments. We would 
like  to  thank  the  participants  of  the  workshop  of  the  ECB Working  Group  on  Public  Finance  held  in  Cracow,  21.06.2010,  and 
especially Bernhard Manzke, for the remarks. All errors remain our own. 
** National Bank of Poland, Swietokrzyska 11/21, 00-919 Warsaw, Poland (Phone: +48-22-653-26-47, janusz.jablonowski@nbp.pl) 
***  Forschungszentrum  Generationenverträge  (Research  Center  for  Generational  Contracts),  Albert-Ludwigs-Universität  Freiburg 
(Freiburg University), D-79085 Freiburg, Germany (Phone: +49-761-203-9226, christoph.mueller@vwl.uni-freiburg.de). 2 
 
List of contents: 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 1 
List of abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7 
2.  The methodology of the Generational Accounting .......................................................... 9 
2.1.  Methodology ........................................................................................................... 9 
2.2.  Indicators ...............................................................................................................11 
3.  Assumptions and data ...................................................................................................13 
3.1.  Methodological assumptions ..................................................................................13 
3.2.  Data .......................................................................................................................15 
3.2.1.  Population projection ..........................................................................................15 
3.2.2.  Fiscal data ..........................................................................................................18 
3.2.3.  Micro-profiles ......................................................................................................21 
3.2.4.  Growth and discount rates ..................................................................................22 
3.2.5.  Limitations of the GA method  ..............................................................................23 
4.  The sustainability of the Polish fiscal system .............................................................26 
4.1.  Pensions paid by ZUS  ............................................................................................26 
4.1.1.  Brief description of the NDC scheme ..................................................................26 
4.1.2.  Computation procedure for NDC pensions..........................................................28 
4.1.2.1.  Computation procedure for bridging pensions .................................................36 
4.1.2.2.  Computation procedure for miners’ pensions ..................................................38 
4.1.2.3.  Computation procedure for minimum pensions ...............................................40 
4.1.2.4.  Generational Accounts for the ZUS pension fund  ............................................42 
4.1.2.5.  Annual Cash Flows .........................................................................................47 
4.1.2.6.  Fiscal gaps and sustainability indicators for the ZUS pension fund..................50 
4.2.  Other types of social insurance provided by ZUS ...................................................54 
4.2.1.  Disability insurance fund .....................................................................................54 
4.2.2.  Computation procedure for disability benefits .....................................................56 
4.2.3.  Sickness insurance fund .....................................................................................58 
4.2.4.  Computation procedure for sickness and maternity leave benefits  ......................58 
4.2.5.  Insurance fund for accidents at work  ...................................................................59 
4.2.6.  Generational Accounts, Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for other types 
of social insurance provided by ZUS .................................................................................60 
4.3.  Social insurance scheme for farmers .....................................................................66 
4.3.1.  Computation procedure for farmers’ pensions, disability, and survivors’ benefits 67 3 
 
4.3.2.  Generational  Accounts,  Fiscal  Gaps  and  Sustainability  Indicators  for  farmers’ 
social benefits system  .......................................................................................................69 
4.4.  Civil servants’ social benefits system .....................................................................72 
4.4.1.  Computation  procedure  for  civil  servants’  pensions,  disability,  and  survivors’ 
benefits  72 
4.4.2.  Generational Accounts for civil servants’ social benefits system .........................73 
4.4.3.  Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for civil servants’ social benefits system
  74 
4.5.  The healthcare system ...........................................................................................78 
4.5.1.  Computation procedure for the healthcare system  ..............................................78 
4.5.2.  Generational Accounts for the NFZ  .....................................................................81 
4.5.3.  Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for the NFZ .........................................84 
4.6.  Education ...............................................................................................................88 
4.6.1.  Generational Accounts for education ..................................................................88 
4.6.2.  Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for education ......................................91 
5.  The sustainability analysis of the entire public finances .................................................92 
5.1.  Generational Accounts for Poland ..........................................................................92 
5.2.  Fiscal gaps and sustainability indicators for Poland  ................................................93 
6.  Conclusions and outlook .............................................................................................  100 
Appendix 1: Sensitivity Analysis .........................................................................................  103 
Appendix 2: Applied micro profiles .....................................................................................  105 












List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Structure of Polish population ................................................................................17 
Figure 2: The development of the age dependency ratio in Poland ......................................18 
Figure 3: Growth rates of employment, real wages, and the real wage bill ...........................22 
Figure 4: The Structure of Contribution rates in 2010 ...........................................................27 
Figure 5: Monthly average gross income in Poland, age brackets 17-68, in 2008  .................29 
Figure 6: Probability to be an FDC participant in 2009  ..........................................................30 
Figure 7: NDC contribution rates ..........................................................................................30 
Figure 8: monthly NDC contributions per contributor ............................................................31 
Figure 9: Probability to contribute to NDC, male ...................................................................31 
Figure 10: Probability to switch from KRUS to NDC, male ....................................................32 
Figure 11: NDC contributions per capita of population  ..........................................................33 
Figure 12: NDC accounts per contributor..............................................................................34 
Figure 13: Pension level per capita of male contributor, in PLN, in 2018, g=0% ...................34 
Figure 14: Probability to retire in the new system .................................................................35 
Figure 15: Change of the expected pension benefit per capita of population, in PLN ...........36 
Figure 16: Expected number of bridging pensioners  .............................................................37 
Figure 17: Expected bridging pension costs, discounted and not discounted, in real terms of 
2007, in million PLN .............................................................................................................37 
Figure 18: Projected number of miners  .................................................................................39 
Figure 19: Projected number of retired miners  ......................................................................40 
Figure 20: Expected minimum pension costs in real terms of 2007, per capita, PLN ............42 
Figure 21: Generational accounting and FGB of ZUS pensions - no 1999 reform, 2007, r=3%, 
g=1.5%  .................................................................................................................................42 
Figure 22: Generational accounting of ZUS pensions – status quo and no 1999 reform, 2007, 
r=3%, g=1.5% ......................................................................................................................43 
Figure 23: Generational Accounts and FGB – new reform proposals, r=3.0, g=1.5, 2007  .....44 
Figure 24: Generational Accounts for miners’ pensions, r=3.0, g=1.5, in real terms of 2007  .46 
Figure 25: FGB for miners’ pensions, r=3.0, g=1.5, in real terms of 2007 .............................47 
Figure 26: ZUS development of pension revenues & expenditures reform scenarios (g=AWG; 
r=0) ......................................................................................................................................48 
Figure 27: ZUS development of pension revenues & expenditures reform scenarios (g=1.5, 
r=0) ......................................................................................................................................48 
Figure  28:  ZUS  development  of  pension  revenues  &  expenditures  cumulated  effect  of 
reforms’ scenario (g=AWG, r=0) ...........................................................................................50 
Figure 29: Fiscal gaps of ZUS old age pension system in different reform scenarios; g=1.5, 
r=3.0  .....................................................................................................................................51 
Figure 30: Required subsidies until the phase out of the pre1999 pension system (g=AWG, 
r=0) ......................................................................................................................................52 
Figure 31: Disability contribution rates, %, years 1999-2009 ................................................55 
Figure 32: Revenues and expenditures of the disability fund in years 2005-2009  .................55 
Figure 33: Profile differences between disability beneficiaries in 2005 and in 2007, in million 
PLN ......................................................................................................................................57 
Figure 34: Revenues and main aggregates of expenditures of the sickness fund, in million 
PLN, 2007 ............................................................................................................................59 
Figure 35: Revenues and main aggregates of expenditures of the Insurance fund for accident 
at work, in million PLN, 2007 ................................................................................................59 5 
 
Figure 36: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS disability fund, 2007 ............................60 
Figure 37: Cash flows development forecast for Disability Insurance Fund, g=1.5, r=0, base 
year 2007 .............................................................................................................................61 
Figure 38: Sustainability gaps for disability in the case of different retirement scenarios ......62 
Figure 39: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS Insurance fund for accidents at work, 
2007, in million PLN .............................................................................................................63 
Figure 40: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS sickness fund, 2007, in million PLN ....64 
Figure 41: Comparison of sustainability gaps between different types of benefits provided by 
ZUS, 2007, % of GDP ..........................................................................................................64 
Figure 42: Number of insured persons and beneficiaries in FER, years 1991-2009  ..............66 
Figure 43: Projection of participation rates in KRUS pension system  ....................................68 
Figure 44: Development of FER revenues and expenditures. Scenarios with outflow and no-
outflow, (g=1.5, r=0), 2007 ...................................................................................................69 
Figure 45: Generational Accounts for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007 .................70 
Figure 46: Sustainability gap for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007, % of GDP........70 
Figure 47: FGB for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007..............................................71 
Figure 48: Generational Accounts for civil servants social benefits system, 2007, in thousand 
PLN, r=3%, g=1.5%  ..............................................................................................................74 
Figure 49: FGB for civil servants, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1.5% ............................75 
Figure 50: Development of old age pensions expenditures for civil servants, r=0%, g=1.5% 76 
Figure  51:  Development  expenditures/revenues  inflow  of  civil  servants  into  ZUS,  r=0%, 
g=1.5%  .................................................................................................................................77 
Figure 52: Number of insured persons and actual healthcare contributors, 2007..................79 
Figure 53: Healthcare contributions per capita of population, 2007, PLN  ..............................80 
Figure 54: NFZ expenditures costs per capita of population, 2007, PLN ..............................81 
Figure 55: Generational Accounts for NFZ, g=1.5%, r=3,0%, 2007, in thousand PLN ..........83 
Figure 56: Generational Accounts for NFZ with additional cost pressure scenario, g=1.5%, 
r=3.0%, 2007  ........................................................................................................................84 
Figure  57:  Sustainability  gaps  for  NFZ  with  additional  cost  pressure  scenario,  g=1.5%, 
r=3.0%, 2007  ........................................................................................................................85 
Figure 58: FGB for NFZ, with additional cost pressure scenario, g=1.5%, r=3.0%, 2007 ......85 
Figure  59:  Development  of  healthcare  contribution  rate  closing  sustainability  gap,  2007, 
g=1.5%, r=3% ......................................................................................................................86 
Figure 60: Development of long term care profiles, per capita, 2006 ....................................87 
Figure 61: Generational Accounts for education, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1.5%  .....89 
Figure 62: Sustainability gap for education, different fertility scenarios, 2007, r=3%, g=1.5%
  .............................................................................................................................................90 
Figure 63: Different fertility rate options ................................................................................90 
Figure 64: FGB for education, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1,5% .................................91 
Figure 65: Generational Accounts for Poland, g=1.5%, r=3.0%, 2007 ..................................93 
Figure 66: Sustainability gap for Poland, g=1,5%, r=3,0%, 2007, % of GDP  .........................94 
Figure 67: Future Generations’ Burden for Poland, g=1,5%, r=3,0%, 2007, in thousand PLN
  .............................................................................................................................................95 
Figure 68: Isolated Sustainability Gaps of the parafiscal and other subsystems ...................96 
Figure 69: Isolated Sustainability Gaps of the parafiscal and other subsystems (in balanced 
cash budget scenario) ..........................................................................................................98 
Figure  70:  Demographic  sensitivity  analysis  for the  sustainability  gap  of  the  entire  Polish 
public finances, 2007, g=1.5%, r=3% .................................................................................  103 6 
 
Figure 71: Sensitivity analysis of the growth and discount rate for the sustainability gap of the 
entire Polish public finances, 2007, g=1.5%, r=3% .............................................................  104 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1: Assumptions of the demographic scenarios  ............................................................16
Table 2: Selected revenue and expenditure categories of the 2007 general government, in 
billion PLN ............................................................................................................................19
Table 3: NFZ revenues for different groups of the population, 2007, in billion PLN  ...............80
 
List of abbreviations 
   AWG: Ageing Working Group (European Commission) 
   CSO= GUS 
   CIT: corporate income tax 
   DB: defined benefit 
   FDC: funded defined contribution, 
   FER: Fundusz Emerytalno-Rentowy (Pension and Disability Fund) 
   FGB: Future Generations’ Burden 
   FR: Fertility rate 
   FRD: Fundusz Rezerwy Demograficznej (Demographic Reserve Fund) 
   GA: Generational Accounting 
   GAs: Generational Accounts  
   GUS: Główny Urzd Statystyczny (Central Statistical Office) 
   KRUS:  Kasa  Rolniczego  Ubezpieczenia  Społecznego  (Social  Insurance  Fund  for 
Farmers) 
   LTC: long term care 
   MoF: Ministry of Finance 
   NDC: notional defined contribution 
   NFZ: Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia (National Healthcare Fund) 
   PAYG: pay-as-you-go 
   PIT: personal income tax 
   ZUS: Zakład Ubezpiecze Społczenych (Social Insurance Institution)   7 
 
1.  Introduction 
“Insolvency” has recently become a standard expression in the media. However, this time the 
reference is not (only) made to the business sector but in fact to European governments. 
Clearly, the trust in the stability of public finances has been severely undermined in recent 
months translating inter alia into considerably higher financing costs on the capital market. 
The current economic downturn will be a challenge for public finances in the years to come. 
Yet, another challenge is gradually arising, which will, probably even more profoundly and for 
a much longer time-span, affect government finances: the ageing population. Poland, one of 
the  biggest  countries  in  Central  Europe,  will  be  confronted  rather  severely  by  this 
development. No other EU country (except Slovakia) will experience such a rapid rise of the 
number of elderly people relative to the working population in the coming 50 years. This 
process can have severe consequences for the stability of public finances via increasing 
age-related social benefits burden imposed on a shrinking working population. Against this 
background the question arises whether the Polish fiscal system can be sustained in the long 
term. Traditional methods of cash/accrual deficit and nominal debt measures focus only on 
the current development of fiscal situations. Therefore, long term stability indicators have to 
be chosen to answer this question. This study provides a sustainability assessment of the 
fiscal  system,  applying,  for  the  first  time  in  the  case  of  Poland,  the  methodology  of 
Generational Accounting (GA). On this basis we aim to bridge to some extent the gap of 
sustainability examinations for Poland. The methodology of GA was developed initially by 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992 and 1994), who sought to illustrate the effects 
of intergenerational policy. After all, probably nearly every piece of legislation affects not only 
living  but  future  generations  as  well.  Since  the  early  90’s,  GA  has  become  a  broadly 
recognized method to measure fiscal sustainability. For the last 15 years several GA studies 
for 29 different countries
1 have been incorporated into professional literature. Some countries 
like Norway even include GAs in their government reports.  
With this study we aim to provide not only an assessment of the sustainability of the overall 
Polish fiscal system but also of its smaller subsystems. On this basis we seek to evaluate 
which isolated subsystems cause the biggest threat to the stability of Polish public finances 
in the long term. Therefore, we modified the usual approach based only on the analysis of 
the  entire  public  finance  sector,  by  dividing  it  into  the  smaller  subsystems:  pensions  of 
various  kinds  (e.g.  ZUS,  civil  servants’  and  KRUS),  disability  and  survivors  benefits, 
healthcare, and education.  
Besides the analysis of intergenerational burdens this study aims to outline the need for 
action.  A  number  of  reforms  have  been  introduced  in  the  past  years  such  as  e.g.  the 
profound  pension  reform  of  1999.  At  present  already  new  modifications  of  the  pension 
system are discussed. Against this background we want to assess whether the sweeping 
1999 pension reform was sufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability of the ZUS pension fund. 
One focus of this study shall, therefore, be on the evaluation of the reformed general pension 
system based on the new notional defined contribution scheme (NDC). Due to the complexity 
of this reform we deviate from the standard GA approach of projecting present benefit and 
contribution profiles into the future. In fact, we compute future NDC pensions on the basis of 
the  actual  NDC  accounts,  altered  retirement  probabilities  and  changing  (age-specific) 
participation rates in the new NDC-system. Furthermore, we aim to take into account in the 
                                            
1 15 of these countries have been estimated in cooperation with the RCG. 8 
 
case of Poland the transformation of specific features, such as the transformation of the 
farming sector. 
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 describes briefly the method of GA and the 
calculation  of  the  sustainability  indicators  used.  The  sources  of  data  used  for  these 
calculations are reported in chapter 3. Here the focus is on data regarding the population 
development, age- and sex-specific benefits as well as contribution (tax) profiles and the 
aggregated general government budget. Furthermore, we discuss in chapter 3 our choice for 
global parameters (growth and discount rates). With the following chapter 4 we provide the 
results  of  the  Generational  Accounting  analyses  using  different  kinds  of  sustainability 
indicators. After an examination of isolated fiscal systems – namely of the general pension 
system,  other  types  of  social  security  benefits  provided  by  ZUS,  the  farmers’  and  civil 
servants’ social security system, public health care (NFZ) and education – we finally take a 
broader  perspective  on  the  entire  general  government  in  chapter  4.  Each  subsection 
referring to an isolated subsystem contains separate, detailed technical description of the 
computation procedures. Chapter 5 summarizes the paper giving additionally an outlook on 
future research.  
  9 
 
2.  The methodology of the Generational Accounting 
To measure the sustainability of a country’s public sector we use the method of Generational 
Accounting  developed  by  Auerbach,  Gokhale  and  Kotlikoff  (1991,  1992  and  1994)
2.  In 
contrast  to  traditional  budget  indicators  which  are  based  on  annual  cash  flow  budgets, 
Generational Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget constraint and therefore the 
long-term implications of a current policy can be computed.  
2.1. Methodology 
The intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector, expressed in present value terms of 
a base-year b is:  













Let D denote agents' maximum age and Nb,k the present value of year b’s net tax payments, 
i.e. taxes paid net of transfers received, made by all members of a generation born in year k 
over the remaining lifecycle. Then, the first right-hand term of equation (1) represents the 
aggregate net taxes of all generations alive in the base-year b. The second term aggregates 
the net tax payments made by future generations born in year b + 1 or later. Together this is 
equal to the left-hand side of equation (1), Bb, which stands for the net debt in year b. That 





kbN , , is negative (i.e. if they receive 
a net transfer) and the net debt, Bb, positive, the sum of future generations’ net taxes has to 
be positive to balance the government’s intertemporal budget i.e. in a long-term perspective 
net transfers received by living generations plus the net debt of the base-year have to be 
financed by net taxes paid by future generations.  
To calculate generations' aggregated lifecycle net tax payments, the net payment terms in 
equation (1) are decomposed into:  





kb s , max
Ts,k     Ps,k      (1+r)
b-s 
In equation (2), Ts,k denotes the average net tax paid in year s by a representative member of 
the  generation  born  in  year  k,  whereas  Ps,k  stands  for  the  number  of  members  of  a 
generation born in year k who survive until year s. To compute the remaining lifetime net 
payments  of  living  generations,  the  future  demographic  structure  is  specified  conducting 
long-term population forecasts.  
                                            
2 The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based on Raffelhüschen (1999) 
and Bonin (2001). For an analytical derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint see Benz and Fetzer (2006) 
or Fetzer (2006). Hagist (2008) gives an overview of the empirical studies with generational accounting along with 
a discussion concerning critical points in theoretical as well as empirical terms. 10 
 
Typically, Generational Accountants disaggregate equation (2) even further. To incorporate 
gender-specific differences in average tax payments and transfer receipts by age, separate 
aggregation of the average net taxes paid by male and female cohort members is required. 
The products aggregated in equation (2) represent the net taxes paid by all members of 
generation k in year s. For generations born prior to the base-year the summation starts from 
year b, while for future born cohorts, the summation starts in year k > b. Irrespective of the 
year of birth, all payments are discounted back to the base-year b by application of a real 
interest rate r.  
The age-specific net tax payment in year s of agents born in year k can be decomposed as  
(3)            Ts,k = 
i
i k s h ,,  
hs,k,i stands for the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received in year s by agents born 
in year k, thus of age s – k.
 3 In equation (3), h > 0 indicates a tax payment, whereas h < 0 
defines a transfer.  
Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally assumed that the initial 
fiscal  policy  and  economic  behaviour  are  constant  over  time.  Under  this  condition  it  is 
possible to project future average tax payments and transfer receipts per capita from the 
base-year age profile of payments according to  
(4)             hs,k,i  =  hb, b-(s-k),i   (1 + g)
s-b 
where  g  represents  the  annual  rate  of  productivity growth.  Equation  (4)  assigns  to  each 
agent of age s – k in year s the tax and transfer payment observed for agents of the same 
age in base year b, uprated for gains in productivity. The base-year cross section of age-
specific tax and transfer payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, the 
relative position of age cohorts in the tax and transfer system is estimated from micro-data 
profiles. In a second step the relative age profiles are re-evaluated proportionally to fit the 
aggregated expenditure and tax revenues of the base-year. 
For living and future generations, the division of the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax 
payments by the number of cohort members alive in year s defines the cohort’s Generational 
Account in year s: 






,   
Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking manner, only the taxes 
paid and the transfers received in or after the base-year are considered. As a consequence, 
Generational  Accounts  cannot  be  compared  across  living  generations  because  they 
incorporate  effects  of  differential  lifetime.  One  may  compare,  however,  the  Generational 
Accounts of base-year and future born agents, who are observed over their entire lifecycle.  
                                            
3 In the case of analysis of the isolated subsystems of public finances, like health care or pension as conducted in 
the following chapters, i is just chosen so that all relevant payment streams are included in the analysis. 11 
 
2.2. Indicators 
The Sustainability Gap 
To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use seven sustainability indicators.
4 
The starting points for the first indicators are the intertemporal public liabilities which can be 
computed by the assumption that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector (1) 
is violated:  
(6)            IPLb = Bb  -  
∞
−= D bk
kbN ,  
The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded claims on future 
budgets,  assuming  that  the  present  policy  will  hold  for  the  future.  The  first  sustainability 
indicator, the sustainability gap (SGb), can be derived if the intertemporal public liabilities are 
set in relation to base-year’s GDP (GDPb). This indicator is akin to the debt quota well known 
since the Maastricht Treaty but it addresses the debt which will occur in the future and in the 
past:  






Future Generations’ Burden 
How  the  policy  adjustment  required  to  redeem  intertemporal  public  liabilities  will  affect 
generations' fiscal burdens depends on the policies addressing this burden. For illustrative 
purposes,  Generational  Accounting  typically  assigns  the  entire  adjustment  to  future 
generations which is equivalent to k > b. All tax payments made by members of future born 
cohorts are adjusted proportionally with the help of a uniform scaling factor . The factor  is 
set to ensure balance of the intertemporal public budget defined in equation (1):  
(8)          hs,k,i  =   ×  hb, b-(s-k),i   (1 + g)
s-b 
for and instead of equation (4). In computing the average age-specific net taxes paid by 
representative future born agents, the burden for future generations can be illustrated as an 
absolute  difference  between  the  Generational  Account  of  the  base-year  agent  and  the 
Generational Account of the agent born one year after the base-year . This is our second 
sustainability indicator, the future generations’ burden:  
(9)          FGB = GAb,b - GA

b, b+1 
Revenue and Transfer Gap  
The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is the revenue gap. In this 
case the scaling factor  = rev reflects the enhancement of age-specific revenues in per cent 
                                            
4  For  a  discussion  of  measuring  fiscal  sustainability  and  the  development  of  sustainability  indicators,  see 
Raffelhüschen (1999) and Benz and Fetzer (2006).  
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for all generations which is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. It 
can also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public liabilities to the present value 
of all age-specific revenues of the fiscal system:  
















with  Revs  referring  to  the  sum  of  revenues  in  year s  by  all  living  generations  in  year s. 
Analogous to the revenue gap, we compute also the so-called transfer gap. In this case the 
scaling factor  = trf  reflects the necessary decrement of age-specific public transfers (Trf) 
like health benefits in per cent for all generations that is necessary to close the intertemporal 
public budget constraint. Constructing the revenue and transfer gap, we implicitly assume 
that the government is able to enforce an immediate adjustment of all taxes and contributions 
or transfers respectively.  
As Benz and Fetzer (2006) have shown all the used indicators are computed with an infinite 
time horizon. In the practical calculation all relevant variables like population or cohorts’ tax 
payments are projected for 300 years from the base-year on. Afterwards a geometrical serial 
is used to determine the remaining net tax payments. The choice of 300 periods is nearly 
completely arbitrary and just reflects a good approximation point for our analysis.
5 
                                            
5 Due to the higher level of discount in relation to the growth rate fiscal flows in the very far future do not play a 
large role for our present value calculation since they are highly discounted. Therefore, it has only a marginal 
effect if one ends the projection after 300 years instead of 300 + x years.   13 
 
3.  Assumptions and data 
3.1. Methodological assumptions 
The following  section  aims  at giving  additional rationale  to  the  methodology  described  in 
chapter 2.1. As summarized by Bonin (2004), the GA usually analyzes the sustainability of 
the fiscal policy at the level of the entire general government sector
6. However, the authors 
decided to take one step further and to check whether more detailed insight into separated 
GAs for selected components of the general government is possible. 
After a decade since the introduction of the 1999 pension reform, the question is raised if 
there is a need to change some of its features. Furthermore, there’s the question whether the 
initial  reform  was  sufficient  to  stabilize  the  pension  system  in  long  term.  Another  doubt 
concerns  the  impact  on  sustainability  of  public  finances  of  other  age  related  types  of 
expenditures, e.g. disability benefits or healthcare. In search for more precise answers about 
the stability of subsystems we wanted to divide the whole general government into smaller 
substructures, and analyze them separately.  
Therefore, in addition to the usual GA approach, we decided to introduce the isolations of the 
most prominent age-specific categories of public finances into smaller subsystems, logically 
consistent, to follow their expected individual development in the future and to be able to 
evaluate  this  individual  impact  on  (un)sustainability  of  the  whole  system.  The  above 
mentioned term ‘logically consistent’ used for isolated subsystem, is obviously insufficient 
and  open  for  interpretation.  Here  we  refer  to  an  isolated  system  in  ‘financial’  terms,  i.e. 
external  financial  inflows  are  frozen,  but  we  allow  flows  of  contributors  and  beneficiaries 
between  isolated  subsystems
7.  Our  approach  to  isolation  is  based  on  the  following 
observations of the non-financial side of the public budgets: 
As in the case of the base year, all consecutive budgetary years in the forecast data consist 
of two sides: revenues and expenditures, spread into the micro-profiles, discounted to the 
present value. Expenditure side usually is treated in accordance with the national accounts 
accrual principle: cash expenditures plus accrued current ‘short’ term liabilities in the base 
year. Revenue side is treated in national accounting more prudentially- here only cash flows 
are considered. But the revenue side also triggers off some other discussions, since in the 
case of isolated subsystems the uncertainty over the revenue projections is high. There are 
at  least  two  options:  with  additional  co-financing  from  the  external  sources  (e.g. 
intergovernmental transfers), or financing based only on ‘own’ resources. The definition of 
own resources can be further interpreted, but here we recognize them as directly collected in 
the budgeting process by the isolated subsystem for own economic purposes. An example is 
provided  by  the  pension  or  healthcare  contributions,  directly  subtracted  from  employees’ 
gross income, before the taxation process.  
What could the consequences of our distinction be? In principle we see two probable options 
here:  
                                            
6 To our knowledge, there are only few exceptions to this rule:  by Baker et al. (2002), at the Federal State level. 
However, the study by Baker is methodologically different, since his GA for each State reflects a “full” spectrum of 
revenue and expenditure categories at regional level, whilst our isolations are based on selected and separated 
subcategories from general, not regional government. Furthermore, Deeg et al. (2009) in their Fiscal Outlook for 
Austria propose an approach to isolations more comparable to ours. 
7 E.g. disability pensioners inflow to ZUS pension scheme, Or farmers who leave farmers’ pension fund In the 
future are transferred to US pension scheme. 14 
 
•  lower deficit
8 (higher surplus or balanced budget) in the case of additional external 
transfers, and, 
•  higher deficit in the case we considered only own resources as those which should be 
recorded on the revenue side. 
It  brings  us  to  the  discussion  on  the  sustainability  indicators  and  sustainability  as  such. 
Depending on the interpretation and assumed prudency level, the isolated system can meet 
the  sustainability  criteria  depending  on  the  revenue  option.  It  can  be  regarded  as  e.g. 
sustainable  in  the  first  case,  and  unsustainable  in  the  second  option.  A  more  general 
application of the rule requires further research since the budgets of selected governmental 
units or schemes can consist of different types of items. However, our exercise based on the 
above rationale gives interesting results in the case of Poland. 
Bearing in mind the mentioned traps, we distinguish two types of subsystems, which differ in 
terms of approach to the revenue side: 
1)  Subsystems  with  own  revenues  (e.g.  directly  collected  social  contributions) 
specifically dedicated to the given category of benefits (expenditures). For instance, 
in the pension system the NDC (ZUS) accounts were isolated – provided that the 
levels of current transfers from the state budget or loans from the banks are volatile, 
and  are  provided  due  to  secondary  division  of  resources  on  the  basis  of 
governmental  decisions.  For this group  of  subsystems  only  contributions,  or  other 
primarily own resources, versus benefits were analyzed. Such an approach can be 
justified by the assumption of logical links in economic agents’ perception between 
fiscal burdens paid for specific purposes of the state activity (e.g. pensions) and the 
benefits derived from the same category of fiscal transfers.  
2)  Subsystems  without  dedicated  revenues,  e.g.  the  Polish  civil  servants  social 
assistance
9 scheme, where all expenditures are covered directly from the budget (in 
fact  the  system  is  always  balanced  by  revenue  from  taxpayers),  were  treated as 
follows: to given annual expenditures, the respective amount of revenues balancing a 
cash  deficit  was  artificially  separated.  As the  expenditure  side  is  projected  by  the 
model into the future, in accordance with the demographics and growth, the revenue 
side  is  progressing  too.  However,  while  in  the  case  of  the  expenditure  side  we 
generally apply a rather detailed age and gender specific profile, this is not the case 
for  the  revenue  side  (in  the  case  of  the  civil  servants,  social  insurance  and  the 
education system). Here we use a flat profile. In other words we spread all “revenues” 
necessary to cover base year expenditures equally over the entire population. This is, 
of course, a very conservative assumption since the working population is financing 
indirectly via taxes the biggest part of the civil servants and education expenditures. 
The revenue side is, therefore, growing independently of the expenditure side, taken 
from  the  base  year.  The  subsequent  difference  in  the  following  years  between 
progressing revenues and expenditures shall transform into surplus or deficit, due to 
e.g. changing dependency ratio. This assumptions raise doubts, since state pension 
obligations  to  civil  servants  shall  be  always  satisfied  by  law.  However,  authors 
followed this line of experiment to find an answer to the question if and to which 
extent the subsystems from the second category of isolation may contribute to the 
overall (un)sustainability of public finances, if they were virtually separated.  
                                            
8 Certainly, other options are possible, depending on the relation between revenues and expenditures (surplus or 
balance). In our approach we gave practical examples, which should explain the broader logic.  
9 According to SNA2008. 15 
 
On the one hand the two above-mentioned methods of isolations may be very interesting, 
especially from the practical point of view, since an isolated set of sustainability indicators 
may give researchers and policy makers a much more profound insight into each subsystem. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  modified  method  poses  several  dangers  to  the  consistency  and 
assessment  of  achieved  results,  due  to  the  influence  of  e.g.  one-off  inter-  and  intra-
governmental flows or other forms of financial support, which often remain unspotted at the 
level of consolidated general government. Additionally, a significant role for the evaluation of 
the  financial  wealth  of  isolated  subsystem  may  be  played  by  e.g.  financial  assets  and 
liabilities.  Net  government  wealth  is  taken  for  computations  at  the  level  of  general 
government, but from the point of view of some subsystems the separation of some assets 
may be more disputable. 
3.2. Data 
To calculate the Generational Accounts and the indicators stated in Chapter 2 we require a 
population projection, the general government revenues and expenditures for the base year 
2007, age-sex specific profiles for various types of revenues and expenditures, the growth 
rate of productivity and the respective discount rate. Due to the lack of all the required data 
for 2008 we have chosen to set 2007 as a base year
10. Therefore, all numbers and values 
are in present values of 2007 if not stated otherwise. Certain profiles in the baseline scenario 
were adjusted and rescaled to their expected shape in the future, to reflect the effects of 
recent reforms (e.g. personal income tax, disability contributions). The population projection 
in the following section is calculated by means of a demographic program developed by 
Bonin (2001).  
3.2.1. Population projection 
The projections used to compute the baseline scenario of generational accounts are based 
on  the  2008  population  projection  of  the  Eurostat, which  is  consistent  with  the  available 
national forecasts of the CSO.  
Based on different assumptions about the three parameters, i.e. life expectancy, fertility and 
migration  it  is  possible  to  derive  a  population  projection  for  each  of  the  demographic 
scenarios.  Own  calculations  are  necessary  for  the  reason  of  GA  assumed  infinite  time 
horizon:  the  official  projections  end  in  2060  while  we  need  approximately  300  years 
projection period. For these calculations we rely on the data and assumptions of Europop 
2008 (convergence scenario) which give assumptions on the above mentioned parameters 
until the year 2060. After this year the demographic parameters are held constant. Table 1 
shows  those  central  assumptions  for  our  standard  scenario.  Additionally,  further 
demographic  scenarios  are  illustrated  which  shall  be  used  for  the  sensitivity  analysis  in 
chapter 6.  
  
                                            
10 In several places the two other base years were used, but only as a reference to 2007, to show broader 
perspective. These additional base years are 2005 and 2006. All such additional references were adequately 
highlighted in the text and in the tables or charts. 16 
 











Feale life expectancy 
at birth in 2007  79,7  79,7  79,7  79,7 
Male life expectancy 
at birth in 2007  71,0  71,0  71,0  71,0 
Female life 
expectancy at birth in 
2060 
88,0  88,0  88,0  89,0 
Male life expectancy 
at birth in 2060  82,5  82,5  82,5  83,5 
Fertility - 2007  1,31  1,31  1,31  1,31 
Fertility - 2060  1,49  1,59  1,39  1,39 
Net migration 2007  -20.485  -20.485  -20.485  -20.485 
Net migration 2060  8.154  8.154  8.154  8.154 





migration  Very old  Very 
young 
Female life 
expectancy at birth in 
2007 
79,7  79,7  79,7  79,7  79,7 
Male life expectancy 
at birth in 2007  71,0  71,0  71,0  71,0  71,0 
Female life 
expectancy at birth in 
2060 
87,0  88,0  88,0  90.0  82.0 
Male life expectancy 
at birth in 2060  81,5  82,5  82,5  85.0  75.0 
Fertility - 2007  1,31  1,31  1,31  1,31  1,31 
Fertility - 2060  1,39  1,49  1,49  1.2  1.8 
Net migration 2007  -20.485  -20.485  0  -20.485  -20.485 
Net migration 2060  8.154  -20.485  0  -20.485  30.000 
Figure 1 illustrates our population projection – the main basis for our GA calculations. It is 
said that demography reflects to a great extent the history of the respective country. This 
becomes apparent when looking at Poland’s age specific population structure in the base 
year 2007. First of all, one can clearly identify the impact of World War II on the cohorts born 
between 1941 and 1946. As commonly observed during periods of war and unrest, birth 
rates were relatively low, resulting in relatively small cohorts aged around 60 in 2007. After 
the end of World War II the fertility rate recovered quite rapidly, which led to strong cohorts 
aged 45 to 60. During the 1960s and 1970s the total fertility rate decreased from nearly 3.0 
to 2.2 children per woman. This explains the drop in the birth rate, which can be observed 
around the age group of 40 in 2007. The subsequent gains in birth numbers can be traced 
back to the fact that the respective cohorts have been born by those aged 45 to 55 in 2007. 
Due to the fact that these are quite large in numbers, their children are numerous as well.  
After the  opening  of  the  Iron  Curtain  in  1989,  however,  Poland  displayed  a  steep  fall  in 
natality—as in most formerly communist countries. In order to project Poland’s demographic 
future,  assumptions  about  fertility  rates  and  life  expectancy  for  the  coming  decades  are 
needed. In accordance with most other population projections, such as Europop (conducted 17 
 
by Eurostat) we assume that the fertility rate will remain at its low present level of roughly 1.3 
children per woman. The assumed evolution of life expectancy in Poland is broadly similar to 
the rest of Europe. While an average male (female) born in 1990 could expect to live for 66.3 
(75.3) years, this value is assumed to rise to 71.0 (79.7) for a male (female) born in 2007. In 
comparison  to  most  other  EU  countries  this  increase  in  life  expectancy  by  almost  four 
months per year is particularly fast. According to Eurostat (2009) life expectancy of a male 
(female) newborn will further increase by around eight (five) years until 2050.  
Figure 1: Structure of Polish population 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
Both, declining fertility rates and the ongoing and rather steep increase in life expectancy 
lead to a significant ageing process in Poland.  As a result, the Polish population pyramid’s 
appearance will considerably change in the coming decades (see Figure 2).The pace of this 
aging  process  is  exceptional—compared  with  other  European  countries.  This  can  be 
illustrated by the old-age dependency ratio, defined as the number of persons aged 65 and 
older, relative to those between 15 and 64. As illustrated in Figure 2, this indicator will rise 
from about 20 percent in 2010 to roughly 70 percent in 2060, which is a steeper increase 
than in any other EU country, except Slovakia. The demographic development of this kind 
puts  substantial  pressure  on  a  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  pension  system  and  can  thus  be 
understood as the main reason for the sweeping pension reforms that are described in detail 
in chapter 4.1.1. As Figure 2 outlines, our demographic projection (coded FZG here) follows 
relatively closely the forecast of the Eurostat. Only in the very long term we slightly deviate 






Figure 2: The development of the age dependency ratio in Poland 
 
Source: own calculations 
3.2.2. Fiscal data 
The pattern for aggregated entries on the revenue and expenditure side reflects available 
micro-profiles. Therefore, revenues consist mainly of value added tax and excise, personal 
(PIT)  and  corporate  (CIT)  income  taxes,  social  contributions,  property  income  and  other 
current revenues, sales and capital revenues.  
In the case when we could derive age and gender specific profiles for revenue items, the 
overall  category  of  other  revenues  was  assigned,  with  a  flat  profile.  Categories  of  taxes 
reflect those paid by working population and pensioners, since each of them consists of a 
different set of probabilities. The social contributions were divided into detailed aggregates 
according to available micro-profiles for the purpose of pensions, disability and survivors, 
accident insurance, sickness insurance and healthcare. We managed to create 14 entries for 
age and gender specific revenues of the general government. 
The aggregates for expenditures also were matched in accordance with the age specific 
micro-profiles provided by several institutions or estimated on the basis of statistical surveys. 
In our opinion the often used COFOG categories of expenditures are not sufficiently adapted 
to the requirements of age and gender specific expenditures. For instance, the function ‘old 
age expenditures’ encompasses altogether pensions paid by the ZUS and KRUS. In principle 
our aim was to separate the aggregates, which would allow for isolations, as stated in our 
assumed ad hoc definitions from chapter 3. The main categories of expenditures derived 
from  the  available  dataset  cover:  pensions  paid  from  ZUS,  KRUS  and  to  civil  servants, 
respective  social  benefits  for:  disability,  survivors,  sickness,  maternity  leave,  accident  at 
work,  several  healthcare  services,  education  and  unemployment.  Due  to  the  special 
importance of the ZUS pension reform effects from 1999, ZUS pensions have been further 
divided  into:  NDC  pensions,  miners’  pensions  and  minimum  pensions.  Many  COFOG 
functions,  like  general  administration,  defence  or environmental  protection  are  consumed 















































purchases’ was created with a respective flat per capita of population micro-profile. Finally, 
interest  payments  and  EU  flows  were  excluded  from  the  dataset  in  accordance  with  the 
standard methodology of the GA.  
The fiscal year 2007 was chosen as a base year, but to be able to reflect possible effects of 
the fiscal reforms (PIT, disability contributions), and to update the dataset to existing fiscal 
developments,  all  micro-profiles  were  adjusted  to  the  real  terms  of  2008,  and  in  several 
cases – to preliminary data of 2009. All in all, we evaluate the sustainability of Polish general 
government  from  the  perspective  of  primary  deficit  net  of  the  effects  of  EU  accession, 
additionally affected by fiscal reforms and economic downturn of 2009. Selected categories 
of revenues and expenditures for the base year are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Selected revenue and expenditure categories of the 2007 general government, in 
billion PLN 
ZUS pension contributions  41,0  ZUS pensions  -67,4 
Miners' pensions contributions  1,9  ZUS minimum pensions  -2,0 
Bridging Pensions' Fund  0,0  Miners' pensions  -6,3 
ZUS disability contributions  34,9  Bridging pensions  0,0 
ZUS accident contributions  4,6  Farmers' pensions  -8,5 
ZUS sickness contributions  7,5  ZUS sickness benefits  -3,6 
Farmers' contributions  1,2  ZUS maternity benefits  -1,4 
PIT work  56,8  ZUS accident benefits  -3,8 
PIT pensions  4,8  ZUS accident benefits (survivors)  -0,5 
VAT  96,2  ZUS disability benefits  -11,9 
Excise  45,5  ZUS survivors' benefits  -20,3 
NFZ work  36,3  Farmers' disability benefits  -2,1 
NFZ pensions  5,9  Farmers' survivors' benefits  -0,3 
Other current and capital revenues  137,8  Civil servants' pensions (Justice)  -0,2 20 
 
    Civil servants' surv. (Justice)  -0,1 
    Civil servants' pensions (Defence)  -3,0 
    Civil servants' disability (Defence)  -0,5 
    Civil servants' survivors (Defence)  -0,9 
    Civil servants' pensions (InternAff)  -3,5 
    Civil servants' disability  (InternAff)  -0,3 
    Civil servants' survivors  (InternAff)  -1,0 
    Civil servants' pensions (PrisonServ)  -0,5 
    Civil servants' disability  (PrisonServ)  -0,1 
    Civil servants' survivors (PrisonServ)  -0,4 
    Basic medical health care  -4,7 
    Medical specialist services  -3,1 
    Dentists’ services  -1,3 
    Long-term home health care services  -0,7 
    Hospital treatment  -18,6 
    Other NFZ expenditures  -12,0 
    Other healthcare expenditures  -13,2 
    Primary and secondary education  -56,1 
    Higher education  -10,7 
   
Unemployment benefits  -2,2 
    Active forms of dealing with unemployment  -2,7 
    Government purchases  -207,2 
Source: Own calculations based on budgetary data 
So far we explained in details how we aim to compile the implicit side of the government 
debt. In addition to this, the standard methodology adds up the explicit general government 
debt, corrected for present value of privatization receipts or any other assets to be disposed 
in the future as a relief in the debt repayment. In our computations we correct the explicit 
liabilities for the relatively small amount of the FRD, to be spent in 2010. Authors do not 
include the other potential government assets due to high uncertainty of their expected value. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  omit  also  the  potential  growth  of  the  government  explicit  debt 21 
 
stemming from contingent liabilities: e.g. probable payments of government guarantees for 
some branches of the economy or potential claims for private wealth confiscated by the state 
in the past. In consequence, the current version of the GA shows the full amount of the net 
implicit liabilities and the explicit government debt, amounting to 529.3 bn (45% of GDP in 
the base year) – corrected for the base year present value of 7.5 bn of FRD resources to be 
used in 2010.  
3.2.3. Micro-profiles 
On the revenues side the data to calculate the old-age-pension, disability pensions, sickness 
allowances  and  accident-at-work  and  occupational  diseases’  contributions  profiles  were 
available  upon  request  from  the  Social  Insurance  Institution  (ZUS).  The  source  data  for 
pension  and  invalidity  contributions  were  provided  by  Farmers’  Social  Insurance  Fund 
(KRUS). Data on the number of insured persons in the healthcare system were provided by 
the National Healthcare Fund (NFZ), though this information was used only as a benchmark 
for checking out consistency. Due to a lack of source data, which during the preparation of 
our report were unavailable in the MoF, we estimated the PIT on the basis of an income 
profile  for  the  working  population.  However  important  limitations  of  quality  shall  be 
addressed. To our knowledge, the official data on effective PIT rates, published on the MoF 
website, refer only to taxpayers whose incomes are subject to taxation under general rules. 
Under these rules (in the base year) three nominal PIT rates were applied: 19%, 30% and 
40%, with the predominant role of the first one (over 90%). According to our estimates the 
general government revenues from PIT, under the above described general taxation rules, 
amounted to 72% of overall PIT revenues (44 out of 61 bn). The missing part comes from 
linear taxation paid by entrepreneurs and from lump sum payments by the self-employed. 
The  VAT  and  excise  profiles  were  elaborated  on  the basis  of  the  survey  on  household 
consumption (CSO, 2007). For each type of household (employees, self-employed, farmers 
and pensioners) the effective VAT or excise rates were applied on given average amounts of 
consumer  goods  and  services.  Unfortunately,  the  described  method  was  in  our  opinion 
insufficient, since it allowed to cover only 27% of overall VAT revenues (26 out of 96 bn
11) 
and 24% of all excise revenues (11 out of 45 bn). These results are definitely not satisfactory 
and not sufficiently representative. An update of this paper should, therefore, improve data 
quality particularly with regard to taxes. 
In principle, we tried to create profiles for all revenue categories. For some revenues we 
were unable to create age-sex specific profiles due to the lack of appropriate data. By these 
missing, important items we mean e.g. the following: Labour Fund contributions, corporate 
income tax (CIT)
12, and the real estate tax.  
For age-sex specific expenditures, the following data sources were used: ZUS upon request 
for  old-age-pensions,  disability  pensions,  sickness  allowances  and  accident-at-work  and 
occupational diseases’ as well as maternity leave benefits; KRUS upon request for pensions, 
disability and survivors’ benefits; source data used for AWG2009 report, stated also as a 
source data in our computations for civil servants (separately for the Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice and Prison Services). Healthcare age specific 
expenditures  were  provided  by  the  NFZ,  but  also  household  survey  on  healthcare 
expenditures (2006, CSO, rescaled to 2007) and the 2007 NFZ annual report were used as 
                                            
11 The amount net of EU flows covers also some part of the VAT paid by general government in relation to e.g. 
investment expenditures. 
12 For more insight into methodology see Auerbach and Chan (2003) 22 
 
source data for computation of isolated micro-profiles. CSO reports on education (school 
year  2006/2007  and  2007/2008)  were  used  to  create  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary 
education  profiles.  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Affairs  provided  upon  request  data  on 
unemployment  benefits,  though  the  quality  and  range  were  insufficient  to  create  the 
satisfying profile. All 56 profiles are plotted in Appendix 2. 
3.2.4. Growth and discount rates 
According to own calculations based on CSO (2009) average growth of GDP per capita over 
the last 11 years (1998-2008) was around 1.9%
13 while the average real long-term interest 
rate (measured by the ten-year Polish government bond - EDO) amounts to ca. 3.4%
14. For 
reasons  of  comparison  with  the  other  countries  assessed  by  the  RCG
15  we  opt  in  our 
standard  setting  for  a  growth  rate  of  1.5%  and  a  discount  rate  of  3.0%.  To  produce 
comparable  results  with  the  AWG  exercises  we  applied  additionally  the  productivity  and 
employment forecast of the AWG – which are illustrated in the following Figure 3: 
Figure 3: Growth rates of employment, real wages, and the real wage bill  
in AWG scenario 
 
Source: Own calculations 
To  cover  the  differences  between  the  actual  development  and  our  standard  scenario,  a 
sensitivity analysis is undertaken in the appendix and discussed in one of the later sections. 
A detailed discussion on the choice of the discount and growth rate is given in the following 
chapter.  
                                            
13 GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) 
14 As a reference we may use also the so called “technical rate” – the value used as a discounting rate for private 
insurance companies, set and updated temporarily by the insurance supervision. In 2009 it amounted to 3.33% in 
real terms. 
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3.2.5. Limitations of the GA method
16 
Over the last 20 years GA has been a topic of recapitulating debate and criticism, pointing at 
the theoretical and empirical limitations and drawbacks of the concept. In this section we 
address  firstly  the  theoretical  objections  with  a  brief  overview  of  several  demurs  in  the 
literature  before  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  empirical  shortcomings  and  uncertainties. 
Reviews of GA can also be found in Cutler (1993), Haveman (1994) and Diamond (1996). 
Kotlikoff  (1997)  and  Raffelhüschen  (1999)  summarize  the  critics  and  reply  to  several 
objections. 
Theoretical Limitations 
Theoretically, two major objections arise when applying GA. The first question is the validity 
of  the  underlying,  neo-classical  lifecycle  hypothesis.
17  The  second  criticizes  the  static 
framework  of  the  concept  and  the  associated  incidence  assumptions.  According  to  neo-
classical theory rational agents determine their lifecycle consumption path at the beginning of 
their  planning  horizon  taking  into  account  their  available  lifetime  resources.  Under  the 
additional assumption of perfect capital markets lifetime resources equal the present value of 
summarized future income, which can be allocated over the remaining lifecycle by either 
borrowing or saving. Intergenerational policy will not affect the optimal consumption pattern 
as long as it does not affect the present value of post-tax future income. GA is putting on at 
this point with its measurement of remaining lifetime resources under current fiscal policy. If 
the planning horizon of individuals was shorter or longer than lifetime, conclusions on the 
ground of GAs could be misleading. One of the most extreme forms of thinking about this is 
the model of Ricardian Equivalence as posted by Barro (1974). This model, also known as 
the  Barro-Ricardo  equivalence  proposition,  assumes  that  families  act  as  infinitely  living 
dynasties due to intergenerational altruism. If this kind of altruism is thorough, fiscal policy 
which effects generations in the future will be  offset by living generations through higher 
bequests.  As  a  consequence  there  would  be  no  need for  such  analysis  as  Generational 
Accounting or even debt quotas as in the Maastricht Treaty. However, empirical evidence 
does not suggest that people behave in the strong Ricardian sense.
18 On the other hand, if 
individuals act myopically or are liquidity-constrained due to imperfect capital markets, the 
lifecycle  postulation  would  overestimate  the  planning  horizon  and  consumption  would  be 
based on current income.
19 Evidence suggests that consumers really put more weight on 
current  income  than  lifetime  one.  Whether  this  is  due  to  myopical  behavior  or  to  credit-
rationing is presently not fully understood.
20 However, as we see also nonmyopic behavior 
like volitional inheritance and voluntary long-term savings, pure myopic preferences seem as 
the  Barro-Ricardo  equivalence  proposition  a  too  strong  assumption.  The  lifecycle  model 
seems to be a good middle way between the myopic and Ricardian assumption and so GA 
delivers a fairly good approximation of intergenerational redistribution through fiscal policy. 
This also holds when considering the second theoretical objection, the underlying incidence 
                                            
16 This chapter follows the elaborated discussion by our colleague Hagist (2008), pp.30-33 on the limitations of 
the GA method. 
17 The lifecycle hypothesis goes back to Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, 1980). 
18 The empirical evidence is at least mixed. See for example Mello, Kongsrud and Price (2004), 
Reitschuler and Cuaresma (2004) and Kotlikoff (2003). 
19 See Buiter (1995) and Buiter and Kletzer (1995). For a model of myopic acting agents see Brown 
and Lewis (1981). 
20 See CBO (1995) and Hayashi (1985). 24 
 
assumptions. GA is a partial equilibrium analysis, neglecting the impacts of net tax burden on 
quantities and prices of consumption and saving, and the repercussions on factor inputs in 
the production process. To accurately assess tax or transfer incidence, only full specified 
dynamic general equilibrium models are sufficient. Three empirical studies have tested GA in 
this respect, i.e. to what extent the results of intergenerational redistribution as measured by 
GAs would change when considering the macroeconomic feedback effects. The evidence is 
again  mixed.  Fehr  and  Kotlikoff  (1996)  show  that  “in  general  changes  in  generational 
accounts provide fairly good approximations to generations’ actual changes in utility. The 
approximations  are  better  for  living  generations.  They  are  worse  for  policies  that  involve 
significant  changes  in  the  degree  of  tax  progression  and  for  economies  with  sizeable 
adjustment costs. Finally, GA needs to be adjusted in the case of small open economies to 
take into account the fact that the incidence of corporate taxation is likely to fall on labour. 
The  method  of  adjustment  is  simply  to  allocate  changes  in  corporate  tax  revenues  to 
generations in proportion to their changes in labor supply. […]” [Fehr and Kotlikoff 1996, 25]. 
Raffelhüschen  and  Risa  (1997)  on  the  other  hand  showed  that  an  equalization  of  the 
intertemporal burden, as suggested by GA, might not be optimal in a welfare sense of view 
or  time  inconsistent  depending  on  the  selected  discount  rate.  As  a  conclusion  of  these 
studies, it can be stated that Generational Accounting represents a superior alternative to 
annual cash flow budgets also in a theoretical framework. However, also GA like annual cash 
flow accounting has the common feature that it does not provide enough information to base 
welfare judgments on the outcome of the accounts alone.  
Empirical Limitations 
After considering the main theoretical objections, the empirical shortcomings are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. Firstly, the most central objection, is the use and selection of 
single growth and interest rates As stated in CBO (1995) “there is no uniquely right discount 
rate”  [CBO  1995,  41].  A  single  discount  rate  combines  the  cost  of  waiting  and  the  risks 
associated with the payment streams i.e. risky tax and transfer payments. Ideally the two 
categories should be divided. Furthermore the cost of waiting could be different for several 
generations.
21  As  a  result  a  single  discount  rate  will  typically distort  the  outcome  of GA. 
Furthermore  the  selection  of  the  discount  rate  is  rather  arbitrary.  Normally,  GA  uses  a 
historical average of long-term government bonds. To induce a measurement of risk for net 
payments, some studies use not a historical average of long-term government bonds but of 
equity. Equally applicable would be to use the base year’s rate of inflation-indexed bonds. 
These  differ  in  some  countries  between  the  historical  average  of  long-term  government 
bonds.
22  The  same  criticism  applies  for  the  growth  or  productivity  rate.  However,  two 
arguments can degrade the criticism of these points to some degree. Firstly, only the spread 
between the interest and growth rate is relevant, at least approximately in the one digit area. 
With macro data, this relationship seems to be relatively stable over time as Fetzer (2006) 
has shown. Secondly, to determine the “right” growth-interest-spread sensitivity analysis in 
sensible areas can be used. Furthermore, indicators like the revenue or transfer gap are not 
very sensitive to variations in the growth-interest-spread. The second empirical shortcoming 
is the fixation of the age- and sex-specific profiles. For example, due to the demographic 
                                            
21 For all these arguments see CBO (1995). 
22 In the case of Germany, an inflation-indexed bond yields a return of about 1.4 per cent while the 30 years 
average return of a ten-year government bond is ca. 3.8 per cent as Fetzer (2006) has  
shown. 25 
 
development, the female labour participation rate could rise and so a change of the relevant 
profiles would occur. Also the health related profiles could be a subject to change due to the 
medical-technical progress.
23 However, as, for example, Fetzer (2006) or Breyer and Felder 
(2006)  have  shown  for  the  health  sector,  the  constant  profile  assumption  is  a  good 
approximation between different possible scenarios. However, as time series of age-specific 
data  will  be  available  in  the  next  years,  stochastic  elements  in  the  profiles  could  be 
introduced in future research. These stochastic elements could already be introduced in the 
next point under criticism, the deterministic population projection. As the demographics are 
the driving forces behind GA, the population projection is a particular point of relevance. 
Population projections are uncertain in two ways. Firstly, the expected parameters in the 
future  like  life  expectancies  or  fertility  rates  are  uncertain.  Secondly,  given  certain 
assumptions about these parameters in the future, the path of development from base-year’s 
values to expected values is also uncertain. Stochastic population projections could deal at 
least  with  the  latter  problem.  Alho  and  Vanne  (2006)  and  Hagist  (2007)  show  that  the 
indicators used by GA are sensitive to certain degrees to stochastic demographics. As far as 
the first problem is concerned, again sensitivity analysis is the only remedy. To take this point 
into  account,  we  provide  results  for  different  population  projections.  The  fourth  empirical 
drawback is the base-year’s budget. As the starting point of the analysis with Generational 
Accounts,  it  leads  to  results  susceptible  to  possible  distortion  by  business  cycle  effects. 
However,  as  Benz  and  Hagist (2007)  have  shown,  the effects  of  the  business  cycle  are 
relatively small.  
Concluding this section, it can be said that GA has important limitations, which have to be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results. However, in some points these limitations apply to 
every kind of projecting or forecasting i.e. uncertainties about future parameters. Others are 
specific to GA. Overall, GAs should be less understood as a forecast but rather as a thought 
experiment. Surely, at some point in time, governments have to and will act and so change 
the results of the analysis. GA can therefore be considered only a highly unlikely “worst-
case”  scenario.  Furthermore  the  method  is  highly  valuable  despite  its  limitations  in 
comparing  different  reform  proposals.  Relative  changes  of  GAs  and  the  associated 
sustainability  indicators  –  as  illustrated  in  the  following  chapter  are  a  reliable  tool  of 
measurement in evaluating the effects of certain reform proposals or changes in policy in 
every field of public finance. 
   
                                            
23 See for example Felder (2006). 26 
 
4.  The sustainability of the Polish fiscal system 
This  chapter  presents  the  outcomes  of  our  computations,  starting  from  a  sustainability 
analysis of separated domains of public finances, then taking a broader perspective on the 
entire  general  government.  The  analysis  start  from  the  NDC  pensions,  followed  by  the 
description  of  disability  benefits  and  survivors’  benefits  paid  from  the  general  system. 
Thereafter we tackle the pension system for farmers and for civil servants followed by the 
healthcare system, with particular focus on the hospital treatment and long term care (LTC). 
Finally, we give a brief description of findings in the field of education. 
4.1. Pensions paid by ZUS 
4.1.1. Brief description of the NDC scheme 
Polish old age provision in its current shape was founded in 1999, when the pension reform 
was  introduced.  It  replaced  the  old-age-pension  provision  system,  with  defined  benefit 
formula, with its large disproportion between paid contributions and pensions to be received, 
based  on  accumulation  of  contributory  and  non-contributory  periods,  selected  from  the 
individual job history. In the new mixed system based on individual funded and unfunded 
accounts the statutory retirement age remains unchanged: 60 years for women and 65 years 
for men. However, the possibility to retire earlier, easily accessible to many professions yet in 
the  new  system  (e.g.  miners,  railway  workers  teachers,  persons  working  in  specific 
conditions),  hampered  the  positive,  self-stabilising  effect  of  the  new  NDC  rules.  Early 
retirement was generally abolished in 2008. The two groups, which kept their early retirement 
privileges in an infinite time horizon are miners and teachers. For the other groups the so 
called ‘bridging pension’ system was installed to ease the process of the abolition of early 
retirement. The new system treats insured persons differently depending on their year of 
birth:  
−  For persons born before 31
st December 1948 all paid contributions remained in the old 
system, so for them the pension is calculated using the old rules.  
−  Persons born between 1
st January 1949 and 31
st December 1968 could have chosen 
whether to stay only in the NDC system or enter the one with split contributions between 
NDC and FDC schemes. Despite their choice the ‘initial capital’ was computed to reflect 
the notional contributions virtually collected during the working life by persons with work 
experience before 1999. Initial capital was computed to translate the pre-reform working 
career to NDC contributions. 
−  All contributors born after 1
st January 1969 are mandatorily covered by the new, shared 
NDC/FDC system.  
Since the pension reform of 1999 the Polish general pension system is based on a three 
pillar system, consisting of the following public and private schemes:  
−  I
st  pillar:  mandatory  notional  defined  contribution  scheme  (NDC),  where  amounts  of 
contributions are recorded on individual accounts, set for every insured person
24. The 
actual contributions are spent on current social benefits. The collected, “virtual” amounts 
are  indexed  annually  with  the  floating  interest  rate,  currently  reflecting  ZUS  pension 
contributions fund growth. The sum of contributions collected over lifetime and indexed is 
divided  upon  retirement  by  the  number  of  (expected)  months  of  remaining  life.  Life 
expectancy tables are unisex, officially published and updated annually by the CSO. 
                                            
24 Farmers and e.g. uniformed services were excluded. 27 
 
−  II
nd  pillar:  mandatory  funded  defined  contribution  schemes,  so  called  open  pension 
funds  (FDC),  where  around  60%  of  employee  contributions  from  the  I
st  pillar  is 
transferred and then invested.  
−  III
rd pillar: consists of the following forms of private voluntary pension insurance funds: 
Employee pension programmes (PPE) created by individual employers, in the form of: 1) 
employee  pension  fund,  2)  agreement  on  contributing  employee  contributions  to  an 
investment  fund  by  the  employer  or  3)  group  investment  employee  life  insurance 
agreement  conducted  with  an  insurance  company  Individual  Pension  Accounts  (IKE) 
provided  by  banks,  insurance  companies,  investment  funds  societies  and  brokerage 
businesses. 
It is important to stress that the latter two pillars (II
nd and III
rd) are fully funded, so self-
financing, and since they’re not part of the general government according to ESA95, 
and SNA2008, we do not consider them in the calculations of the GA. 
Contributions  are  computed  on  the  basis  of  gross  income  of  employees,  self-employed, 
persons running businesses outside agriculture, etc. The flow of contributions for persons 





* FDC part of the contribution is paid only by employees  
** Accident contribution rate varies and depends on risk of work related accident.  
 
To  promote  other  forms  of  private  pension  schemes,  e.g.  those  from  the  III
rd  pillar,  the 
‘ceiling’  for the maximum  amount  of  annual  contributions  was  introduced  once  the gross 
income reaches the amount equal to 30 times the average monthly salary in the economy (or 
250% of annual average salary), the contributions are not collected until the end of the year. 
The new system does not assume the maximum ceiling for the pension – since it depends 
strictly  on  the  amount  of  collected  and  indexed,  notional  contributions  recorded  until 
retirement.  Though  existing  contributions’  ceiling  limits  the  annual  contribution  inflow  to 
Employer  Employee 
9,76%  2,46%  +   7,30%* = 9,76% 
Social Insurance Fund (FUS) 
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individual  accounts,  if  the  working  period  extends  over  statutory  retirement  age,  the 
contributions collected after statutory retirement age increase the overall NDC value. In this 
respect contributions’ ceiling does not impose a limit on the maximum pension to be paid 
from the NDC part. 
To  prevent  possible  future  liquidity  constraints  in  NDC  pension  payments,  a  buffer  fund 
(Demographic Reserve Fund) was created. Up to now its assets are not very significant, 
consisting mainly of government bonds. Presently (2010) this fund amounts to less than 5% 
of the annual ZUS pension expenditures. In the case of default of the NDC, the state budget 
guarantees the payment of social benefits. The first use of the FRD sources to support the 
pension fund is expected in 2010 in the amount of 7.5bn
25. We reflect this relatively small 
amount as decreasing in real terms of the explicit debt of isolated ZUS pension scheme and 
the whole general government discounted to the base year. 
Apart from these assets of the FRD the mismatch of contributions and expenditures of FUS 
can and has been financed by additional support from the state budget. In recent years the 
deficit  of  FUS  covered  by  state  budget  transfers  and  to  some  extent  by  loans  was 
considerable.  In  the  base  year  the  amount  of  additional  support  from  the  state  budget 
amounted to over 30% of NDC’s total revenues. A number of factors influenced the growing 
deficit  of  FUS  namely:  a  relatively  short  effective  working  period  resulting  from  early 
retirement possibility, the ceiling on social contributions, the outflow of significant portion of 
employee  contributions to  FDC,  the  lack  of  contributions for  persons on  maternity  leave, 
parental leave, and handicapped persons and the liquidation of the so called “old portfolio” 
(increase in the lowest pensions) for older pensioners. 
4.1.2. Computation procedure for NDC pensions 
The  computation  of  the  relatively  complex  transformation  of  the  Polish  pension  system, 
described  above,  imposes  certain  challenges.  If  we  decided  to  apply  the  standard  GA 
approach, based on continuous development of today’s profile of pension expenditures into 
the future, with an adjustment for growth, we would actually project the old system into the 
future, since pensions paid in the base year are paid only for persons who retire under the 
regime of the old system. It would then be an obvious mistake – in such a scenario we would 
show the consequences of a lack of the 1999 reform! Instead, we need to show the walking 
changeover from this old system anchored in the base year profile, to a mixed system of 
higher (19.52%) and lower (12.22%) contributions collected for persons born between 1949 
and 1969 arriving at the system where all contributions are based on a flat profile (at a level 
of 12,22%). By the explicit term ‘walking’ we mean that each next year of the forecast there 
will be one cohort less from the old system, and one cohort more from the new system. As a 
consequence, in several decades all contributors shall pay 12.22% and receive their NDC 
pension based on this lowered percentages of pension contributions. In order to forecast 
future  pension  expenditures  one  has  to  develop  the  forecast  on  the  basis  of  expected 
progress of average account levels for each cohort, weighted with numerous probabilities. 
Then we will describe our computation procedure in greater detail. The NDC pensions are 
calculated in a few steps, starting from the age/gender specific gross income
26 per 1-year 
cohort, adjusted for the probability to be a member of the working population, as depicted in 
Figure 5: 
                                            
25 Further imputation of remaining resources of the FRD seems disputable, e.g. apart from around 10.5 bn of 
assets at the end of 2009, the fund recorded also liabilities of 4.4 bn.  
26 Structure of wages and salaries by occupations in October 2006 (CSO, 2007). 29 
 
 
Figure 5: Monthly average gross income in Poland, age brackets 17-68, in 2008  
 
Source: own calculations. 
Here we would only like to stress that we derive an expected wage profile. Hereby we take 
into  account  that  contributors  show  certain  age  and  gender  specific  probabilities  to  be 
unemployed. Therefore, the expected wage profile is lower than the average income of an 
average  employee  –  see  Figure  6
27.  This reflects  the fact  that  the  state  is  paying  social 
contributions for unemployed persons, which, in consequence, lowers the gross income per 
capita. The  state  pays the  contributions for  unemployed  persons  during  the  period  when 
they’re allowed to receive the unemployment benefit. In our projection we assume that this 
probability will remain constant over time.  
The next step in our procedure reflects the probability to be either a NDC or a NDC/FDC 
member. The probability was based on the information on the number of age/gender specific 
FDC  accounts,  as  of  2009.  Only  registered  and  verified  accounts  were  taken  into 
consideration for persons born between 1949 and 1969: 
                                            
27 Age and gender specific unemployment probabilities are derived on the basis of Eurostat. We apply a 10 year 
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Figure 6: Probability to be an FDC participant in 2009 
 
Source: own calculations based on data provided by ZUS 
For all persons born before 1949 the pension expenditure and contribution profiles of the 
base year are applied. Their probability to be a member of the NDC and FDC system is zero. 
For persons born in 1969 and later we assumed 100% probability to enter the NDC/FDC 
scheme. Each year of the forecast following the base year the probability is adjusted to a 
walking  profile,  i.e.  in  2015,  comparing  to  2007,  eight  more  cohorts  will  pay  12.22%  of 
pension  contributions,  so  eight  less  cohorts  will  pay  19.52%  and  so  on.  In  this  way  we 
compute the cohort specific contribution rates.  
Figure 7: NDC contribution rates 
 
Source: own calculations 
Furthermore,  after  the  application  of  cohort  specific  contribution  rates  to  gross  salary  we 
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Figure 8: monthly NDC contributions per contributor 
 
Source: own calculations. 
In the next step age/gender specific contributions are weighted with the probability to be a 
NDC  contributor.  We  derive  this  value  examining  the  ratio  of  contributors  to  the  overall 
population size in each cohort and for both sexes. This ratio amounts to around 60% for 
persons aged over 60 in the base year. For younger cohorts it reaches a level of around 
73%. We assume that the participation in the NDC system is constant over time and we keep 
the (age-specific) probability to contribute to the NDC system as they increase from 60% to 
73%. Of course, the probability to be a contributor is affected not only by age and gender 
specific employment rates but also by retirement probability. In order to model the change of 
future  retirement  behaviour  –  due  to  e.g.  the  increase  of  legal  retirement  ages  and  the 
abolishment of early retirement schemes – we separate the influence of retirement decisions 
in our computation. Therefore, we keep the probability to be a contributor constant at a level 
of 63% for cohorts aged 45 and older (see Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Probability to contribute to NDC, male 
 




































































































































































































































At this stage one important extension is introduced: an inflow of contributors due to the future 
transformation of the farming sector. In our standard scenario we reflect that the farming 
sector will shrink in the coming decades reaching the EU average in 2060. This outflow from 
KRUS is accompanied with respectively equal inflow into ZUS. The corresponding probability 
to switch the insurance system from KRUS to NDC is described in more details in chapter 
devoted to farmers’ social insurance. As plotted in Figure 10, an inflow of individuals who 
decided  not  to  enter  the  farming  sector  has  considerable  influence  on  the  probability  to 
participate in the NDC system.
  
Figure 10: Probability to switch from KRUS to NDC, male 
 
Source: own calculations 
With the given probability to be a NDC contributor we finally receive the contributions per 
capita of population – see Figure 11. This micro approach chosen to reflect especially the 
phasing  in  of  the  1999  pension  reform  is  relatively  complex.  In  order  to  guarantee, 
nevertheless,  a  match  with  actual  aggregate  data  we  finally  rescale  the  computed 
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Figure 11: NDC contributions per capita of population 
 
Source: own calculations 
The dotted line in Figure 11 is a sign of the ‘walking profile’ over the years – clearly showing 
that in 2020 a bigger number of contributors will be paying lowered contributions.
28 Here it 
becomes already obvious that in the coming years individual pension contributions will be 
lower than today which will be a challenge for the (medium term) financing of the pension 
system. In this context one also has to bear in mind that these lowered contributions have to 
finance relatively high pension entitlements of present pensioners. We will come back later to 
this  issue  when  analyzing  the  future  development  of  ZUS  expenditures.  Figure  11  also 
shows the impact of the inflow from the farming sector, especially for the age groups 35 to 
45.  Nevertheless,  these  additional  contribution  payers  can  only  partially  counteract  the 
effects of the lowering of contribution rates.  
Since the contributions paid in the base year are not recorded from the “zero” level, then to 
reflect the expected pensions in the future we shall reflect the history of accumulation of the 
contributions and the initial capital on the NDC. On the basis of information provided by ZUS 
on the levels of NDC accounts for each cohort in the base year we may start up to forecast 
the expected future levels. 
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Figure 12: NDC accounts per contributor 
 
Source: own calculations 
The expected accumulation of contributions by each cohort is increased additionally by the 
legally  required  indexation  of  the  accounts,  equal  to  the  growth  of  the  aggregated 
contributions.  This  wage  bill  growth  is  based  on  the  future  productivity  and  employment 
growth.
29 As shown in Figure 13, longer working period contributes significantly to the higher 
expected pension level upon retirement.  
Figure 13: Pension level per capita of male contributor, in PLN, in 2018, g=0% 
 
Source: own calculations 
After the year 2009 for women, and 2014 for men, all new pensioners are obliged by the 
rules of the new system to retire not sooner than at the age of 60 and 65, respectively. 
Therefore,  we  derive  these  future  retirement  probabilities  on  the  basis  of  present  (2007) 
retirement probabilities. This is simply done by summing up all probabilities before 60/65. An 
                                            
29 Our presumptions on future employment growth are illustrated in chapter devoted to assumptions and data. 



















































































































































































occupation group, which can retire earlier than the statutory retirement age are teachers. Of 
course, also bridge pensioners and miners pensioners can retire earlier, but they are treated 
separately – see following chapters. A considerable number of teachers enter the pension 
system at the age of 50 to 54. This explains the slight increase for these age groups in 
Figure 14. In accordance with the assumption of the invariant retirement behaviour over time 
the  probabilities  to  retire  after  statutory  retirement  age  remain  unchanged  in  the  future, 
though they are limited to the age of 68. For every year the retirement probabilities sum up to 
one. 
Figure 14: Probability to retire in the new system 
 
Source: own calculations 
The resulting pension benefits per capita of the population are outlined in Figure 15. It shows 
pensions  dropping  per  capita  in  the  coming  decades,  which  is  a  strict  consequence  of 
phasing-out of the pension system. The very low per capita pension level for persons retiring 
later than at the statutory age should not be interpreted as a per capita cost of each new 
pensioner – the low amount of the benefit reflects the assumed low probability value to retire 

































































Figure 15: Change of the expected pension benefit per capita of population, in PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
Due to the different legal rules set for different professions in the Polish pension system the 
above described procedure requires a few corrections in probabilities  and at the level of 
aggregated contributions and pension expenditures. Corrections have been introduced for 
two  groups  of  persons:  early  pensioners  entitled  during  the  transition  period  to  early 
retirement, and miners, who kept their early retirement privileges without a time limit.  
4.1.2.1.  Computation procedure for bridging pensions 
This group consists of persons working in specific conditions
30, who are paid the so called 
bridging pensions, received in principle for 5 (or 10) years between the early retirement at the 
age of 55/60 for women/men, and statutory retirement age of 60/65. Due to the expected 
very  small  number  of  10  year-long  bridging  pensions,  and  related  10  year  long  specific 
probabilities, we assumed that all bridging pensions will be paid for 5 years. The bridging 
pension act, which came into force in 2008, limited significantly the possibility to retire earlier 
for the vast majority of persons. In consequence, after 2008, only a narrow, selected group of 
professions will be allowed to retire earlier for some time in the future. To reflect the bridging 
pensions in our calculations the assumptions of the background document attached to the 
bridging  pension  act  was  used,  or  more  precisely,  its  description  of  expected  economic 
effects of bridging pensions in the future, as presented in Figure 16 and Figure 17: 
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Figure 16: Expected number of bridging pensioners 
 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 17: Expected bridging pension costs, discounted and not discounted, in real terms of 
2007, in million PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
The calculation of the missing data of the expected bridging pensions’ costs was based on 
the following assumptions: 
•  According to the information provided in the above-mentioned reports more than 90% 
of railway workers retires 5 years 
31 before the statutory retirement age. 
•  Provided the already mentioned assumption of time-invariant retirement behaviour, 
we assume that railway workers retirement behaviour is representative for all current 
and future bridging pensioners.  
•  The inflow of new pensioners grows at the decreasing pace until 2017 and then starts 
to drop at the average pace of 10% per year, each year until 2040, when it falls to 
zero.  
•  The total  number  of  bridging  pensioners  changes  in  accordance  with  the  pace of 
inflow, as described above. Additionally, it is gradually reduced when after 5 years the 
bridging  pension  ‘transforms’  into  standard  pension  paid  from  the  statutory  NDC 
                                            
31  http://www.zus.pl/files/kolejowe2007.pdf,  available  in  June  2010.  Actually,  the  computations  of  retirement 
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account. In consequence, the same number of pensioners, which inflows in year t is 
subtracted in t+5.  
•  Every  bridging  pensioner  who  leaves  the  bridging  pension  system  “automatically” 
increases  the  probabilities  to  retire  at  the  statutory  age  of  60/65  in  the  old-age 
pension system. In other words: the outflow from the bridging pension system equals 
the inflow to the NDC pension system 5 years later.  
•  The average bridging pension was estimated by dividing the expected overall annual 
bridging pensions’ costs (not discounted) by the number of bridging pensioners.  
•  Bridging Pensions Fund, settled to ease the bridging pension costs burden imposed 
on  the  taxpayers  shall  collect  contributions  amounting  to  1.5%  of  salaries  in 
enterprises hiring persons who work in harmful conditions: we estimate that the pace 
of inflow of contributions shall decrease over the years at a pace of around 96% 
every year
32. 
Initially, teachers’ work was not regarded by law as particularly harmful for health, so they are 
not included in the bridging pension system. After the introduction of the legal act on special 
compensations for teachers in 2009, they in principle kept a part of the privileges from the 
past  system.  According  to  new  rules,  teachers  who  prove  required  30  or  20  years  of 
contributory  periods  upon  retirement  in  years  2009  –  2014  may  retire  at  the  age  of 
55(w)/60(m). In the coming years the retirement age will be gradually increased until 59/64 in 
years  2031-2032.  In  our  assumptions  based  on  the  analysis  of  teachers’  retirement 
behaviour
33 we assume an accumulation of the probabilities to retire from previous years at 
an  age  that  is  relevant  for  the  above-mentioned  periods.  In  other  words,  we  assume  a 
gradual unification of retirement age for teachers with the NDC system until 2032. Due to the 
lack of available information on gender specific structure for this profession we assumed that 
it consists in 2/3 of women and 1/3 of men, with the flat probability profile to be a teacher in 
all cohorts of the working population. The teachers’ compensational pensions will be paid 
from the ZUS pension fund, so we modify the probability to retire at a certain age in the ZUS 
pension system accordingly. 
4.1.2.2.  Computation procedure for miners’ pensions 
A profession, which profits from the early retirement privileges in an infinite time horizon is 
mining. Legal rules set for this group in 2005 petrify the old system rules, where a pension 
was  based  on  contributory  and  non-contributory  periods.  Additionally,  a  significant  factor 
contributing  to  miners’  pension  levels,  is  a  relatively  high  average  “pension  calculation 
basis”
34, directly related to the so called multiplier coefficient (every year of working carrier 
multiplies in principle by 1.8) and to some extent to high miners’ salaries.  
Since  miners’  pensions  are  based  on  old  rules,  different  from  standard  NDC  system’s 
provisions, their contributions increase the overall sum of ZUS pension contributions, but are 
not registered on the NDC accounts. In consequence, the sum of contributions collected on 
the NDC accounts are lower than the actual overall amount of pension contributions in the 
                                            
32 These assumptions have very minor impact on the sustainability analyses of the pension system: average 
annual inflow of contributions to the Bridge Pension Fund shall amount to around 35 m, comparing to e.g. 1 bn of 
expenditures on bridge pensions around year 2030. According to preliminary data for 2009, the bridge pension 
costs are smaller than our estimates, so their expected impact in the future should be smaller, also in comparison 
to estimates assumed in the bridge pension act. 
33 http://www.zus.pl/default.asp?p=5&id=491, reports on social benefits for teachers, ZUS, years 2004-2008.  
34 PLN 3831.08 for miners, and PLN 1923.28 for average ZUS member. 39 
 
base year. In seeking for more precise outcomes we excluded the miners’ pension system 
from available data and computed them separately. The isolation process starts with the 
estimation  of  the  expected  number  of  miners.  This  forecast  was  based  on  a  combined 
analysis of some variables published annually by ZUS for particular occupations, including 
miners: the number of miners
35, miners’ retirement behaviour in years 2004-2008
36 and the 
number of miner pensioners in these years
37. According to our assumptions, the number of 
miners will gradually drop to around 140,000 in 2040. However, this figure was estimated on 
the basis of a statistical trend, which can make our assumptions controversial. Nevertheless, 
if the number of contributors in mining was dropping faster or below our assumptions, then 
the revenue side of virtual miners’ pension scheme could be even more undermined. 
Figure 18: Projected number of miners 
 
Source: own calculations 
If we assume again a constant retirement behaviour in the case when  undoubtedly generous 
benefits are continued to be granted to miners, the results are as follows: 60% out of today’s 
ca. 180,300 miners shall retire after 25 years of work, and another 35% after 30 years. With 
the given number of miners-pensioners (around 200.000), which grows exponentially,  we 
assume that  the  trend shall  reverse  in  the  coming  years  and  put  the  number  of  miners-
pensioners at level of around 180,000 in years 2033-2038. Therefore, between base year 
200,000 pensioners and 180,000 pensioners expected in 25-30 years we ‘draw’ a curve, 
which is our proxy for the estimated number of miners’ pensioners in the future. 
                                            
35 According to Employment in national economy (CSO, 2007) there are around 180.3 thousands of miners. 

































Figure 19: Projected number of retired miners 
 
Source: own calculations 
In the next step we estimate the average miner pension contributions, which are based on 
the  average  miner’s  gross  salary
38  treated  with  the  time-invariant  nominal  pension 
contribution  rate  19.52%.  With  the  given  number  of miners  in  the  economy,  this  simple 
method  will  provide  us  with  the  annual  pension  contributions  paid  by  (and  for)  miners. 
Miners’ salaries grow with our standard annual growth rate g of 1.5% in real terms. The 
miners’ pension profile, based on the data provided upon request by ZUS, is rescaled to the 
level of average pensions that are indexed with 0.2*g until 2060. The probability to be a 
miner remains unchanged in the future and is flat for male working cohorts aged from 20 to 
45; to reflect the probability of retiring it starts to drop to reach zero at the age of 69.  
4.1.2.3.  Computation procedure for minimum pensions 
Some  corrections  to  compute  levels  of  future  NDC  pensions  are  particularly  difficult  to 
predict, and one of them is the expected burden on the NDC pension system resulting from 
the minimum pensions. In the new system the difference between expected pension and 
minimum pension level is paid to a person who meets two conditions:  
•  his/her overall amount of collected and indexed NDC and FDC contributions divided 
by life expectancy must be insufficient to satisfy minimum pension,  
•  such person should prove at least a 20 (women) or 25 (men) year working period.  
The analysis of the working period of ZUS average new pensioners suggests that the latter 
condition is satisfied in over 90% of cases, and the overall cost came to around 2.3 bn in 
2008. Knowing the age and gender specific profile of minimum pension in the base year we 
assume that it will remain constant in the future. This implies that the probability to receive a 
minimum pension stays constant over time. Of course, such a simplified approach can be 
criticized. The new (NDC) pension formula leads to a cut of yearly pension entitlements – in 
comparison to the pension system before the 1999 reform. It could therefore result in an 
increase  of  the  probability  to  receive  a  minimum  pension.  However,  this  effect  might  be 
                                            


































counteracted by a longer working period.
39 Future research should analyze these two factors 
and their impact on the future development on minimum pensions. 
It  is  important  to  stress  also  other  consequences  of  single  income  levels  per  cohort:  we 
neglect the variable structure of salaries between groups of employees who are the same 
age. For instance, for self-employed persons, whose salaries are relatively high comparing to 
economy average, the basis of the pension contributions is declared by law at level of the 
minimum income, stipulated by law to constitute 60% of the minimum salary in 2008
40. In 
consequence, for this group of persons the salaries are high, but the contributions paid to the 
NDC scheme are much smaller. Since we include their salaries in the average for all cohorts, 
for which we apply the nominal pension contributions’ rates, we most probably overestimate 
the inflow of contributions from the high-income self-employed entrepreneurs.
41  
Indexation is a further crucial issue for the projection of minimum pension expenditures. So 
far minimum pensions are adjusted annually to 20% of the salaries’ growth in the economy. 
In the long run this rule would lead to an “extinction” of the minimum pension. This is caused 
by the growth differential between pension entitlements (before retirement) – which grow with 
the  wage  bill  growth
42  –  and  the  minimum  pension.  As  a  consequence,  fewer  future 
pensioners will fall under the threshold of the minimum pension which will lead to a future 
decrease of minimum pension expenditures (measured in % of GDP). However, it is highly 
debatable  whether  a  perpetuation  of  the  low  minimum  pension  indexation  is  politically 
realistic.  When  we  put  together  all  the  above-mentioned  issues  related  to  the  minimum 
pension, we may formulate initial conclusions in reference to the minimum pension issue: 
−  when analyzing the current average working period for ZUS members, almost everyone 
will meet the working period criterion for compensation to minimum pension, if NDC/FDC 
contributions prove insufficient to qualify for such a pension; 
−  the application of the flat income profile, stemming from modest available data source on 
income distribution in the economy, results in a lack of separated pension contribution 
profiles for the self-employed insured in NDC, who pay lower than average contributions, 
which may be a reason to become a ‘minimum pensioner’; 
−  results  of  our  computations  do  not  show  threats  of high  budgetary  compensations  to 
minimum pension level, in case the minimum pension indexation remained on the level of 
20% of the wage’ growth. 
                                            
39 For an examination of the adequacy of future pension levels see Leifels et al. (2010). 
40 Actually amounting to 53% in 2008 (Social Insurance in Poland, ZUS, 2009).  
41  As  described  before  we  use  the  average  salary  of  employees  in  Poland  as a  basis  for  the calculation  of 
contributions. So far we are  not differentiating between self-employed persons and employees, which clearly 
could  lead  to  a  considerable  degree  of  inaccuracy. However,  we  overcome  this  limitation  to  great  extent  by 
rescaling our computed contribution data to actual aggregated contributions in 2009. Still, our pension model 
could be further improved by a distinction between different employee groups.  
42 Even when considering negative employment growth (AWG assumptions) in the coming decades the annual 
adjustment of pension entitlements (before retirement), i.e. of NDC accounts, is still expected to be higher than 
the indexation of minimum pensions.   42 
 
Figure 20: Expected minimum pension costs in real terms of 2007, per capita, PLN 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of data provided by ZUS 
4.1.2.4.  Generational Accounts for the ZUS pension fund 
As illustrated in chapter 3 the general old-age-pension system (ZUS) underwent profound 
reforms in recent years. The reform of 1999, which inter alia introduced the present NDC 
system, represents a milestone. The following chapter aims to address the question to what 
extent the current design of ZUS is prepared for the future demographic challenges. Was the 
1999  pension  reform  appropriate  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of  the  ZUS  pension  fund? 
Currently new reforms are debated. Besides a modification of female retirement ages also a 
partial  abolishment  of  the  1999  reform  is  presently  discussed.  Are  these  new  reforms 
required? The following chapter shall also address this question. But first we shall take a 
closer look at the profound pension reform of 1999.  
Figure 21: Generational accounting and FGB of ZUS pensions - no 1999 reform, 2007, r=3%, 
g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
Where  are  we  coming  from?  Figure  21  shows  generational  accounts  for  pensions  and 
contributions paid by ZUS in a no-1999-reform-scenario. It is straightforward that this old 
pension system would not have been sustainable in the long term
43: All cohorts (aged 0 to 
100)  are  net-beneficiaries,  i.e.  they  obtain  more  ZUS-benefits  than  they  pay  ZUS-
                                            
43 This is even more remarkable considering that the old system had a much “stronger” revenue basis. Every 









































contributions over their remaining life-cycle (in present value). Of course this no-1999-reform 
scenario suggests a big threat for future newborns since eventually somebody has to pay the 
bill, the annual deficits. Next we carry out a thought experiment that all arising debts have to 
be closed by future generations. The resulting burden for future cohorts is illustrated by the 
generational account of a -1 year old, i.e. a person born one year after the base year. A 
representative  of  this  generation  would  have  to  pay  net  ca.  PLN  240,000  over  his/her 
remaining life-cycle. In other words he/she would be considerably worse off than a 0 year old 
– by about PLN 270,000. This represents  considerable intergenerational redistribution.  
Coming to the first conclusion, the old pension system imposed large fiscal burdens on future 
generations and was clearly not sustainable.  
Figure 22: Generational accounting of ZUS pensions – status quo and no 1999 reform, 2007, 
r=3%, g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
Where  did  we  go?  As  outlined  in  chapter  4.1  the  pension  reform  of  1999  marked  a 
remarkable change of paradigm for the Polish old age provision. Not only NDC accounts 
have been implemented but also parts of the former PAYG contributions have been shifted to 
funded schemes (FDC). Overall, this reform package considerably improved the long-term 
stability  of  the  ZUS  pension  fund  –  as  outlined  in  Figure  22.  The  burden  on  future 
generations – shown on the example of a -1 year old – diminished by about PLN150,000.  
The interesting question is also how present generations are affected by the reform of 1999. 
As shown in Figure 22 for persons already retired, aged 60 and over, the reform has no 
effect, since all of them retired upon rules of the old system. The impact of the reform can be 
spotted, however, for persons born after 1948. The reform has clearly a larger impact on 
younger cohorts aged 50 and below. The main reason for this difference of intergenerational 
burdens  lies  in  the  calculation  of  initial  capital.  Older  persons  (aged  50+)  –  who  have 
relatively  long  contribution  histories  before  1999  –  could  benefit  to  a  larger  extent  from 
generous rules for the calculation of their initial capital. Next, the effect of the 1999 reform 
shall be illustrated taking as an example the cohorts aged 50 (in the base year). In the no-
1999-reform scenario these cohorts would receive net PLN 160,000 over their remaining life-
cycle from ZUS – illustrated in the respective generational account in Figure 22. In other 
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that only future cash flows are considered here. After the 1999 reform these cohorts are still 
net-beneficiaries  of  the system  but the generational  account  amounts only  to  about  PLN 
70,000 , instead of PLN 160,000, i.e. these cohorts receive net PLN 90.000 less due to the 
reform. Also for younger the cohorts a considerable twist occurs. All cohorts starting from 
current newborns until the age of 35 are expected to be net payers to the system.  
Coming to the second conclusion, the 1999 reform considerably increased the long term 
stability of the ZUS pension fund. The cohorts affected by this reform are born after 1948.  
Figure 23: Generational Accounts and FGB – new reform proposals, r=3.0, g=1.5, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
Where could we go? Figure 23 shows the expected impact on GA of recently discussed 
reform proposals: the extension of working period for women from 60 to 65, and cut off in the 
FDC share of the contribution. The scenario for women assumes a gradual lengthening of 
the contribution period, starting from 2026 until 2035. Each year a female worker would have 
to work half a year longer – in consequence the working period is extended by five years 
within  a  ten  year  transition  period.  For the  FDC  cut  we  assumed  the  recently  discussed 
proposal  of  a  decrease  from  the  current  7.3%  to  3%  of  the  pension  contribution,  to  be 
transferred to the FDC. In other words, a larger part of agents’ pension contributions stays in 
ZUS,  which  means  that  pension  entitlements  recorded  on  individual  accounts  increase 
according to vesting formulas. The assumptions on isolation remain unchanged. 
The picture of GAs remains almost unchanged for the consequences of the longer working 
period of women, for all living cohorts. The reason is straightforward: Due to the (relatively) 
neutral actuarial design of the NDC pension system the longer contribution periods of women 
(until  65)  are  equalized  by  increased  pension  levels.  In  net  and  present  value  terms, 
therefore, GAs remain almost constant. The same argumentation counts for the FDC cut 
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in increased retirement incomes in the future. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the impact of 
the FDC cut reform is more visible than considering a scenario with higher female retirement 
ages. One explanation lies in the applied concept of calculating GAs in present value terms. 
With  this  approach  present  payments  –  in  case  of  the  FDC  cut  reform:  higher  present 
contributions – are discounted less than future payments – in case of the FDC cut reform: 
higher future pensions.
44  As a consequence, the GAs turn out to be slightly higher for this 
latter  reform  scenario.  Of  course,  mainly  younger  cohorts  are  affected  by  a  cut  of  FDC 
contributions since they participate fully in the NDC/FDC system.      
Comparing  to  no-1999-reform  scenario  we  conclude  that  the  factor  which  played  the 
foremost role in the 1999 pension reform with respect to sustainability measured by the GA, 
was  the  introduction  of  the  individual  pension  account  for  each  contributor.  To  give  an 
explanation for this argument one has to take a closer look at the NDC benefit formula. In 
comparison  to  the  old  defined  benefit  system  before  the  1999  reform,  the  NDC  system 
automatically  adjusts  pension  benefits  to  the  future  demographic  development.  The 
indexation of the NDC accounts in accordance with the wage bill growth is one example 
here. Additionally, the consideration of increasing (unisex) life expectancies in the (NDC) 
benefit  formula  results  in  a  more  sustainable  pension  system.  The  individual  pension 
accounts also clearly lead to a direct linkage between contributions and benefits in the Polish 
pension system. Therefore, in the case of lowered contributions to be transferred to FDC the 
impact on sustainability is marginal. Higher contributions simply translate into higher pension 
levels.
45 To put it simple: the financing of the current ZUS pension fund cannot be regarded 
as very problematic in the (very) long term (see box 1). As a consequence, taking a long 
term perspective with the assessment of sustainability any downscaling of this (relatively) 
sustainable system does not make it significantly more or less sustainable. However, it is 
important  to  stress  that  in  the  coming  30  years  the  system  is  faced  with  a  substantial 
challenge to bear the so called “double burden”
46. We will outline this later in chapter 4.1.2.5. 
In the case of a longer working period imposed on women, the consequences are the same 
as for any other worker, irrespectively of gender and age: if one works longer/shorter, he/she 
accumulates higher/lower entitlements. The interpretation of this reform step is similar to a 
cut  of  FDC  contributions:  higher  female  retirement  ages  represent  an  extension  of  the 
(relatively  sustainable)  NDC  system.  The  long-term  balance  of  contributions  and 
expenditures is almost unaffected. Nevertheless, at this point it should be already noted that 
the  timing  and  the  extent  of  annual  cash  flows  is  considerably  affected  by  both  reform 
proposals. This will be outlined in the following chapter 4.1.2.5 on cash flows. 
Coming to the third conclusion: the increase in female retirement age shows only marginal 
impact on the fiscal long term stability. The FDC reform would have a more apparent but still 
limited  influence  on  the  fiscal  sustainability.  It  is  limited  due  to  the  fact  that  the  huge 
additional inflow of contributions in initial stage of the reform is accompanied by increased 
pension expenditures in the long term.  Additionally, in this context it is important to point out 
that the focus of this study lies on sustainability, which is clearly only one side of the coin. As 
                                            
44 In other words the timing of revenues and expenditures is crucial for the slightly higher impact of the FDC cut 
reform. This issue will be outlined in further detail in the following chapter 4.1.2.5 on cash flows 
45  Of  course,  these  increased  contributions  with  a  significant  time  lag  result  in  higher  pension  levels.  In  our 
computations – calculating in present value terms – fiscal flows in a more distant future are highly discounted. 
Therefore, an increase of present contributions – which is accompanied by an increase of pension levels in a 
more distant future – leads to slightly better sustainability results. 
46 Sometimes referred to as quadruple burden. 46 
 
Leifels et al. (2010) demonstrate another important criterion to assess pension systems, the 
adequacy of pensions, is indeed strongly affected by these reforms. The authors show that 
especially for cohorts born between 1965 and 1985 the pension reform leads to significant 
pension gaps, i.e. these cohorts will be to a lesser extent able to cover their pre-retirement 
level of consumption than current retiree generations.
47  
Assuming  the  same  pattern  as  for  ‘pure’  NDC  pensions  we  may  analyze  the  ‘dinosaur’ 
system of miners to check its sustainability in a scenario in which miners’ scheme would be 
separated from the NDC. Therefore, if we set aside the miners’ subsystem, analyzing their 
pension receipts net of miners’ contributions paid, the miners’ GAs are isolated, as plotted in 
Figure 24. 
Figure 24: Generational Accounts for miners’ pensions, r=3.0, g=1.5, in real terms of 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
Unsurprisingly, miners’ GAs are shaped similarly to the no-1999-reform scenario, but the 
effect is even more visible. This seems to be a consequence of the situation where, for each 
PLN 1 paid into the system, an average miner receives PLN 3 in pensions, paid in most 
cases in the age range of 47 to 55. Cumulated net receipts of a 50-year-old cohort amount to 
almost PLN 10,000. Consequently, we follow with the virtual miners’ pension scheme FGB: 
                                            
























Figure 25: FGB for miners’ pensions, r=3.0, g=1.5, in real terms of 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
The  Miners’  pension  system  seems  comparable  to  no-1999-reform  FGB  chart,  but  is  far 
more extreme in its relative magnitudes. A newborn who will become a miner (with a certain 
probability) should bear a personal debt of PLN 9,000 to balance the miners’ system in the 
long term. Such a system is very comfortable for its beneficiaries if it is highly funded from 
outside – in fact not only by other ZUS contributors, but all taxpayers via the current support 
from the government to ZUS.  
4.1.2.5.  Annual Cash Flows  
The GAs show long term sustainability improvement of the NDC pension system, but the 
single indicator trap has to be avoided. Complementary analyses of the cash flows
48 show 
additional consequences of the proposed reforms, to be followed in Figure 26 and Figure 27. 
Most importantly, these annual cash flows demonstrate the timing effects. In other words, 
they show the development of expenditures and revenues in the coming years. With the 
indicator of annual cash flows we follow closely the perspective of the Ageing Working Group 
(AWG) and the so called ‘walking forecast’ of the ZUS, which analyzes the future flow of age- 
related  revenues  and  expenditures.  For  the  sake  of simplicity  the  miners’  pensions  and 
bridging  pensions  were  excluded.  In  order  to  get  a basis  for  comparison  with  the  AWG 
results we implemented here the time varying growth rate of the AWG
49. In comparison to the 
stock values the following (flow-) figures are not calculated as present value, i.e. the discount 
rate equals zero.  
                                            
48 Including NDC, minimum, miners and bridge pensions. 






















Figure 26: ZUS development of pension revenues & expenditures reform scenarios (g=AWG; 
r=0) 
 
Source: own calculations 
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pension contributions (standard scenario) expenditures (standard scenario) 
pension contributions (later retirement) all general expenditures (later retirement)49 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
The visible bump in pension expenditures, sharply falling after year 2027, is a consequence 
of the phasing out of the old system. The drop is a remote echo effect of the pension formula, 
gradually decreasing contribution rate (from 19.52% to 12.22%) and a longer working period 
of both men and women. Furthermore, the specific structure of the Polish demography – 
described in chapter 3.2.1– plays a role in the sharp increase of pension expenditures until 
2026. While relatively large cohorts will go into retirement in the coming years, smaller birth 
years follow after the year 2026.  
The  status  quo  translates  into  the  GAs  scenario  with  the  1999-reform  presented  in  e.g. 
Figure 22. As plotted in Figure 26 and Figure 27, despite higher AWG growth assumptions, 
the longer working period for women results in sluggish reaction on the revenue side of the 
pension  fund.  The  kinks  in  the  plot  for  years  2026-2035  reflect  the  transition  period, 
described in the assumptions of the reform. The reaction time on the expenditure side is 
longer, but still visible: a longer working period means significantly less pensions paid in the 
transition period. However, longer work also implies longer accumulation of NDC accounts, 
resulting  in  higher  pension  payments. When the  entire  population  of  (female)  pensioners 
retires later with a correspondingly higher pension – around 25 years after the beginning of 
the transition period – the overall pension expenditures turn out be considerably higher than 
in the status quo. To some extent, lowered FDC contributions reform results would go in the 
same  direction,  but  with  a  higher  magnitude.  An  immediate  and  huge  increase  in  cash 
revenues, resulting from the change in higher NDC share, would much quicker remedy the 
cash deficit of the ZUS pension fund. The expenditure side holds in the status quo scenario 
until the time of retirement for the affected working population, starting around 2034. Further 
higher expected pension payments stay in proportional relation to the increased inflow of 
pension  contributions  25  years  before.  Cumulated  results  of  both  reforms  are  plotted  in 




50 development of pension revenues & expenditures cumulated effect of 
reforms’ scenario (g=AWG, r=0) 
 
Source: own calculations 
Lower deficit is observed in the case of high growth rate (AWG), which can be explained by 
pension indexation rules. While revenues grow per capita with the general wage growth, 
pensions are indexed “only” by 20% of the general wage growth. 
4.1.2.6.  Fiscal gaps and sustainability indicators for the ZUS 
pension fund 
Figure 29 shows pre- and post-1999-reform sustainability gaps together with the expected 
change  due  to  women  longer  working  period  and  a  cut  in  FDC  contributions.  The  chart 
confirms general observations described in the GAs analysis: the implementation of the NDC 
accounts  had  a  significant  influence  on  the  long-run  fiscal  stability.  It  lowered  the 
sustainability gap by almost 250% of the GDP. In other words “only” one time GDP value 
from the base year has to be set aside in order to finance all future deficits of old age ZUS-
pension.  In  the  no-1999-reform  scenario  340%  of  GDP  have  to  be  put  aside  to  run  the 
system until infinity. As has been shown in the previous sub-chapter most of the implicit 
liabilities in the status quo scenario arise from the double burden of the 1999 reform. As a 
consequence  of  this  reform,  entitlements  of  the  old  pension  system  have  to  be  paid  by 
lowered PAYG contributions (dropping from 19.52% to 12.22%). This leads to a significant 
mismatch  of  contributions  and  expenditures  in  the  transformation  period,  mainly  in  the 
coming 30 years (see also box 1). Nevertheless, it will take roughly until 2080 to totally phase 
                                            








































































































































pension contributions (standard scenario) expenditures (standard scenario)
pension contributions (both MoF reforms) expenditures (both MoF reforms)51 
 
in  the  new  NDC  system.
51  Figure  29  also  illustrates  once  again  the  relatively  minor 
sustainability impact of the increase of female retirement age . The FDC cut reform, which 
brings  back  to the  NDC  scheme  half  of the contributions transmitted  before to the  FDC, 
shows some improvement of the sustainability gap, though not by half, but only barely by 
20%. It confirms our conclusion that the factor that plays a key role for the improvement of 
the sustainability was the introduction of the individual accounts for each member of the NDC 
scheme in 1999. 
 
Figure 29: Fiscal gaps of ZUS old age pension system in different reform scenarios; g=1.5, 
r=3.0 
  
Source: own calculations 
Coming to a conclusion, the sustainability of the ZUS (old age) pension system has been 
significantly improved by the reform of 1999. Especially the automatic adjustment of pension 
levels to demographic changes guarantees a better stability of long term pension finances. 
Due to the so called double burden – caused by relatively high entitlements to be financed by 
lowered  (PAYG)  contributions  –  however,  we  can  expect  a  considerable  mismatch  of 
contributions and expenditures in the coming 30 years. How this deficit will be financed – 
whether by tax payments, on the basis of a (partial) shift of contributions from FDC to NDC, 
or by longer working periods – has to be decided by politicians.  
                                            



































Box 1: Tax inflow or no tax inflow? The long run perspective 
The term sustainability has become increasingly popular in politics and media in the recent decade. With 52 
 
                                            
52 From the year 2053 – when all present pensioners have died – until 2080 – when every pensioner has paid solely 
12.22 per cent over his entire contribution career – we apply a linear phase out.. 
53 Only for the NDC accounts – without miners and bridge pensioners. 
its widespread use it also became clear that this word is used and defined very differently – and is often 
even misused. Generally, it is agreed that when taking the sustainability perspective we want to find out 
whether a (legally defined) system can be run until infinity. Against this background, one can criticize our 
approach to allow no tax inflow into the isolated pension system. At present about 30% of ZUS revenues 
are financed by the state budget. So the crucial question is whether we should project this tax inflow into 
the future, too, when isolating ZUS pensions. According to the legal rules of the status quo there is no 
binding and clear rule that deficits shall always be covered by the state budget. The deficit of the ZUS, 
which has a certain degree of legal and economic independency, can  also be covered from other sources: 
short term loans from the banks or expected one-off capital  injections from the Demographic Reserve 
Fund. Therefore, we do not include tax inflow, and any other form of financing in the status quo scenario. 
But is this a politically realistic scenario? Most probably also in future budgetary years one will observe 
large tax inflows into ZUS. Some people might say that the double burden described above legitimates a 
tax inflow into ZUS – at least to the point when the new pension system is phased in totally. The old 
system is phased out to a large extent when present pensioners have died. As Figure 30 depicts after 2053 
no expenditures arise from present pensioners in the base year. However, also after this year retirees 
receive as higher pension due to the fact that they have paid more than 12.22 percent in contributions. 
Hence the system is not phased in completely until the last pensioner of this category has died – which is 
roughly the year 2080. Until this point in time relatively high pension entitlements have to be financed by 
low contributions of 12.22 percent. Hence, one could legitimate a inflow of tax money until the year 2080.
52 
The tipping point is whether the present pension system still runs large deficits after it is fully phased in. 
The answer is given in the following Figure 30. It shows the expenditures and revenues until 2150. This is, 
of course, a long projection period, so the results should be taken with caution due to a very great level of 
uncertainty about the longer future. Besides the phase out of present pensioners of the base year also a 
subsidy scenario is given. In this scenario we assume that the double burden of the pension system is 
financed via taxes until the system is fully phased in. Thereafter no taxes are paid to ZUS. 
Figure 30: Required subsidies
53 until the phase out of the pre1999 pension system (g=AWG, r=0) 53 
 
 
   
 
Source: own calculations 
The figure makes clear that the present level of tax inflow into ZUS is not necessary in the long run. But it 
is  also  obvious  that  ZUS  still  runs  a  deficit  after  the  (full)  phase  in  of  the  1999  pension  reform.  The 
expected smaller, but still apparent, imbalance of the ZUS pension fund is caused by notional accounts, 
which do not wipe out the disproportion between the number of future contributors and the growing number 
of pensioners. In fact cash deficit in the future will depend on cash inflows from contributors, and the then 
cash payments to pensioners. This indicates that further reform measures might be required in the longer 





































































































































































pension contributions (status quo) present pensioners expenditures (status quo)
expenditures ( status quo) taxes (subsidy scenario)54 
 
4.2. Other types of social insurance provided by ZUS 
The  current  chapter  collects  the  outcomes  of  the  GA  related  calculations  for  the  other 
analyzed age-specific benefits provided by ZUS. In accordance with the fiscal structure we 





























The above listed benefits do not encompass all types of social benefits provided by ZUS. 
However,  only  for  these  benefits  the  micro  source  data  was  fully  or  partly  available. 
Altogether,  the  micro  data  of  other  than  pension  related  expenditures  provided  by  ZUS 
amounted to 41.4 bn or 33% of the total ZUS expenditures in the base year. Together with 
pension and pension related expenditures they cover around 95 bn, or 95% of total ZUS 
expenditures in 2007. 
4.2.1. Disability insurance fund 
Disability and related survivors’ benefits are also very high expenditure items, next to old age 
pensions, of age-related benefits provided by ZUS. The disability benefit is provided to 
persons who are incapable to work and completed the criterion related to a sufficient number 
of contributory and non-contributory years. There are two statuses of incapability to work: 
partial  and  complete  incapability.  Each  status  of  incapability  to  work  stands  for  different 
entitlement amount
54.  
Disability contributions are obligatory for the same group of the working population as the 
pension contributions, but the contribution burden, originally shared in equal parts between 
employer and employee drifted across last years towards a higher burden financed by the 
employers. The main source of the revenues are social contributions related to disability and 
additional  internal  transfers  within  FUS. The revenue  side  of  the  disability  fund  deserves 
special  attention  due  to  the  fiscal  reform,  resulting  in  cuts  in  disability  contributions 
introduced in three stages: 
−  from 1999 to 30 June 2007: 13.0% (of which employer’s part 6.5% and employee’s 
part 6.5%), 
                                            
54 The benefits paid from the Disability Insurance Fund are not related to incapability to work related to accident at 
work. The latter category of benefits is paid from the Work Accident Insurance Fund. 55 
 
−  from 1 July 2007 to 31 December 2007: 10.0% (of which employer’s part 6.5% and 
employee’s part 3.5%), 
−  1 January 2008 6.0% (of which employer’s part 4.5% and employee’s part 1.5%). 
Figure 31: Disability contribution rates, %, years 1999-2009 
 
Source: ZUS website 
Significant  cuts  in  contribution  rates  resulted  in  a  sudden  drop  of  the  disability  fund’s 
revenues  after  2007.  However,  probable  additional  cyclical  effect  of  the  financial  crisis 
resulted in a smaller inflow of own revenues of the disability insurance fund.  
Figure 32: Revenues and expenditures of the disability fund in years 2005-2009 
 
Source: Justification of the state budget act, *2009 estimates 
In the base year around 1,2mln persons were covered by the benefits paid due to partial or 
complete incapability to work.  
On the expenditure side the micro profiles were provided by ZUS. According to data provided 
for  the  base  year,  the  disability  benefits  paid  from  the  ZUS  disability  insurance  fund  to 




















































4.2.2. Computation procedure for disability benefits 
For the projection of disability benefits we used a ‘standard’ profile.
55 However, in order to 
reflect recent legal amendments as well as indexation rules a few further modifications have 
been made. First of all, we divided beneficiaries into present and future disability pensioners. 
For the present beneficiaries the computation is relatively straightforward. They are projected 
into  the  future  taking  into  account  expected  mortality  probabilities.  Only  one  further 
amendment is needed - in order to reflect the new legal setting, namely the switch from the 
disability to old age pensions system at the new legal retirement age, man (woman) younger 
than 65 (60) in the base year, can get disability benefits only until these age limits. Only 
present male (female) pensioners older than 64 (59) in 2007 – who are mainly war veterans 
– keep receiving their (disability) annuities until their death. For new disability pensioners, i.e. 
beneficiaries  who  receive  a  pension  for  the  first  time  after  the  base  year,  there  are  no 
exemptions.  Their  probability  to  be  a  beneficiary  of  disability  pensions  after  the  legal 
retirement age is zero. For a deeper examination of the separation and projection of present 
and new pensioners see Heidler et al. (2009). Profiles for 2007 for existing and new-coming 
ZUS disability fund beneficiaries as well as contributors were rescaled to aggregates of 2008 
and 2009 to reflect the actual impact of legal changes. Such correction should reflect and 
extrapolate into the future a widening of the deficit of the disability fund, following Figure 31 
and Figure 32.  
Together with a sluggish positive effect on the expenditure side (disability benefits 27 bn in 
both  years)  stemming  from  the  disabled  persons  who  reached  statutory  retirement  age 
switching to ZUS pension fund, the disability fund deficit deteriorated in 2008 and 2009 – see 
Figure  32.  In  the  following  years  we  assumed  a  continuation  of  fund’s  self-financing 
constraints due to low contribution inflows (lower rates) and moderate influence of the war 




                                            
55 The presumed consequences of recently rejected reform proposals, which aimed to link the disability benefits 
with the NDC account stocks, were not taken into our computations. 57 
 
Figure 33: Profile differences between disability beneficiaries in 2005 and in 2007, in million 
PLN 
 
Source: own calculations on basis of the data provided by ZUS 
It is important to stress that fairly easily accessible disability benefits were broadly used in 
the  past  as  a  source  of  escape  into  early  retirement.  In  recent  years  numerous  legal 
amendments prevented such behaviour. Analyses of profiles provided by ZUS in this respect 
for years 2005-2007 do not yet reflect this process – its full impact is to be expected in the 
coming years. Additional ‘new’ progress can be expected in the coming years due to the cut 
of early retirement rules – described in chapter 4.1.2.3. This legal change can lead to a 
behavioural feedback observed also in other European countries. Individuals simply might try 
to  retire  earlier  by  getting  the  status  of  being  disabled.
56  However,  due  to  a  significant 
uncertainty of the magnitude of these two processes, their probabilities were not introduced 
into our computations.  
Another group of ZUS beneficiaries who generates significant costs are survivors. Survivors 
are  members  of  the  family  who  continue  to  receive  a  certain  percentage  of  the  benefit 
originally assigned to a employee, a disabled beneficiary or a pensioner. Survivors’ benefits 
are financed from two funds: disability insurance fund and insurance fund for accident at 
work. No accident-at-work related survivors’ benefits amounted in 2007 to around 18.3 bn, 
paid to 1.3 m of beneficiaries, compared to 0.5 bn of accident-at-work related benefits, paid 
to 0.2 m of beneficiaries.  
There are no survivor specific revenues, whilst their benefits are a ‘derivative’ of the original 
benefit – in most cases disability benefit, and to some extent they relate to pre-retirement 
benefits  and  old  age  pensions.  It  is  vital  to  underline  that  survivors’  benefits  in  our 
computations  are  not  derived  from  the  original  pension  benefit,  as  it  happens  in  reality. 
Therefore,  we  presume  that  our  forecast  gives  a  slightly  overestimated  picture  of  future 
survivors’ benefit burden. Recently, the number of disability payment beneficiaries stabilized, 
which  may  suggest  that  recent  legal  restrictions  put  on  disability  benefits  may  curb  the 
                                            
56  It  will  be  interesting  to  analyze  these  behavioural  responses  after  the  full  implementation  of  stricter  early 
























































































retirement age 58 
 
previous probability to become a beneficiary. In this respect our results may be to some 
extent  exaggerated  for  survivors’  benefits  that  are  related  to  primary  disability  benefits. 
However, so far we stick in our GA calculations to the probabilities to become a survivor at 
an unchanged level in the future. Therefore, for survivors we project their profiles of the base 
year into the future without any major modifications.
57 
4.2.3. Sickness insurance fund 
The next category to be analyzed consists of benefits paid from the sickness insurance fund. 
It covers benefit categories provided in the case of temporary incapacity to work. In respect 
of sickness and maternity the following types of benefits are provided: 
•  sickness allowance, 
•  maternity allowance, 
•  care allowance, 
•  compensatory allowance, 
•  rehabilitation benefits. 
Compulsory sickness insurance does not cover the same number of persons that are insured 
by the pension and disability insurance. The smaller probability to become a beneficiary of 
the sickness benefit relates to the different risk exposure of professions. Contrary to pension 
and disability insurance, for which the insurance costs are shared by the employer and the 
employee, the sickness insurance contributions are paid entirely by the employee at the rate 
of  2.45%  of  gross  income.  As  in  the  case  of  other  funds  of  FUS,  the  revenues  of  the 
Sickness Insurance Fund consist mainly of contributions and partly of other revenues, as 
presented in Figure 34. The main categories of expenditures amounted to 3.6 bn (sickness 
benefits) and to 1.4 bn (maternity leave benefits), which together summed up to 5 bn or 86% 
of total fund expenditures.  
4.2.4. Computation procedure for sickness and maternity leave benefits 
Micro-profiles for other types of benefits covered by this fund, like long-term care assistance, 
were unavailable. Since the profiles for both maternity leave benefits and sickness leave 
benefits were not provided but actually created on the basis of the number of sickness leave 
and maternity leave days per year per cohort, the simplest method of extrapolation of profiles 
for existing beneficiaries was applied. 
                                            
57 In order to reflect indexation rules, however we separate also here into present and new pensioners.  59 
 




4.2.5. Insurance fund for accidents at work  
The subsequent category covers benefits related to accident at work and survivors’ benefits 
related to accidents at work. Apart from accidents at work, this type of insurance covers 
occupational diseases, in specific cases of work in special (harmful) conditions or work of 
special characteristics. Contributions are paid entirely by employers, at a progressive rate 
starting from 1.67% of gross income. The contribution rates depend on the work-related risk 
of harm or accident, set differently for different occupations. Actually, all revenues of the 
accident fund are covered from the contributions. Base year expenditures for benefits related 
to accident at work to disabled persons and survivors covered over 80% of overall fund’s 
expenditures. In the base year there were around 220,000 disabled beneficiaries and around 
30,000 survivors paid from this fund. Micro-profiles for the Insurance fund for accidents at 
work  were  provided  by  ZUS,  and  needed  no  refinement.  Figure  35  illustrates  amounts 
involved for the Insurance fund for accidents at work in the base year: 
 
Figure 35: Revenues and main aggregates of expenditures of the Insurance fund for accident at 
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Source: ZUS 
4.2.6. Generational Accounts, Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators 
for other types of social insurance provided by ZUS 
The following Figure 36 illustrates the generational accounts for the disability fund (disability 
and survivors financed only from disability contributions, no ‘tax’ inflow), Insurance fund for 
accident at work (accident benefits with accident related survivors’ benefits), and finally the 
sickness fund (sickness and maternity leave benefits financed also only from the inflow of 
contributions). The highlighted column on the left hand side stands for the burden of future 
generations.  
 
Figure 36: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS disability fund, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
The sustainability gaps for three remaining ZUS social funds follow closely the level of deficit 
in the base year: the disability fund shows a sustainability gap of almost 97% of GDP, whilst 
the accident and sickness funds  almost net each other in terms of sustainability.  
GAs for the disability fund show a significant sustainability gap and FGB. Its shape seems 
very similar to the old PAYG-type of pension scheme or no-1999 reform and miners GAs. 
The base year deficit and expected significant further disproportion between revenues and 
























Figure 37: Cash flows development forecast for Disability Insurance Fund, g=1.5, r=0, base 
year 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
We may initially conclude that:  
•  A  lower  contribution rate  decreases the fiscal burden  imposed  on gross  incomes, 
which could spur households’ consumption and savings.  
•  one  can  expect  a  high  deficit  borne  by  disability insurance  fund  during  economic 
downturns,  to  be  covered  from  state  budget  transfers  (in  fact  taxes)  or  financial 
liabilities – now as in the future.  
Our indicators suggest that the disability fund can be a threat to the low deficit and stable 
public finances in the long run more than the ZUS pension fund. While ZUS old age pensions 
impose  a  challenge  on  the  public  finances  in  the  coming  30  years  –  due  to  high 
transformation costs of the partial switch from the PAYG to the funded system – the disability 
















































































































































































































































   
Box 2: Impact of higher female legal retirement ages on the disability fund 
In our standard scenario we always tried to reflect the current legal status. Of course, politicians 
might decide to change the legal setting in the coming years. One such reform scenario concerns 
the increase of the legal retirement ages – described in greater detail in chapter 4.1.1. First of all this 
reform changes the conditions to receive an old age pension. It is, however, interesting that it has 
also a significant impact on the future disability expenditures, since longer working period for women 
implies also longer disability benefiting periods. As a consequence, the disability gap would increase 
in this reform scenario by roughly 2 percentage points – see Figure 38. This is just an example how 
legal changes of one fiscal system have a direct impact on other institutions. It highlights the fact 




GAs for the Insurance fund for accidents at work give a slightly better impression than the 
disability insurance fund. Though main payments refer to disability payments, which in this 
case are accident related, a better correspondence between Insurance fund for accident-at-
work contributions and expenditures (lower deficit) suggests how important role is played by 
the deficit of this fund in the case of this type of scheme. We will recall that the contribution 
rate for the Insurance fund for accidents at work in principle is set at the level of 1.67% of 
gross  salary.  However,  if  the  risk  of  injury  at  work  is  higher,  the  contribution  rate  is 
adequately increased to even 8%. Due to data quality and the applied rather conservative 
approach,  the  authors  assumed  the  time  invariant  structure  of  contribution  rates  among 
contributors. In consequence our computations may differ from the actual development of the 
GAs for this fund, if the above-mentioned distribution of the contribution rates changed.  
Figure 38: Sustainability gaps for disability in the case of different retirement scenarios 
 

























GAP disability scenarios 
base year 2007, r=3%, g=1,5%63 
 
Figure 39: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS Insurance fund for accidents at work, 2007, 
in million PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
The GA for the sickness fund paints a much more optimistic picture than in case of the 
disability and accident fund. Actually, so far it’s the first unit which shows GA surplus. There 
are a few explanations for this phenomenon: we repeat that there are two major categories of 
sickness fund payments – sickness leave benefits and maternity leave benefits. Both of them 
are paid temporarily, and what is most important for long term sustainability: both types of 
benefits are paid to the working population, which will not grow considerably in comparison to 
pensioners. For the case of maternity leave we take into account that in the future decades 
there will be a decreasing number of women who can benefit from maternity benefits, i.e. 
fewer females aged 19 to 40. Therefore, maternity expenditures will grow at a relatively low 
pace. For our calculation, we take, however, one simplifying assumption: the probability to 
receive a maternity leave at a given age stays constant over time, i.e. we apply a constant 
profile over time. This assumption is inconsistent with the fertility forecast we apply for our 
population projection (see chapter 5). In this case we assume – based on Europop2008 – 
slightly increasing fertility rates until 2060. Further research could consider time-varying age 
specific probabilities to receive a maternity benefit.  However, we assume that lack of this 
shift in maternity benefits does not bias our results to the extent where we would change the 
conclusions. FGB of the sickness fund could suggest the possibility to lower its contribution 
rates,  since  future  generations  receive  a  “gift”  from  living  generations  (first  highlighted 
column on the left hand side). But the sickness fund is one of the four FUS funds, three of 
which show relatively significant sustainability gaps. Cash surplus of this fund might then 

























Figure 40: Generational Accounts and FGB for ZUS sickness fund, 2007, in million PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 41 indicates sustainability gap comparison of the three remaining social insurance 
funds, which form together the FUS in comparison to ZUS NDC pension fund and miners’ 
fund. 
 
Figure 41: Comparison of sustainability gaps between different types of benefits provided by 
ZUS, 2007, % of GDP 
  
Source: own calculations 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned analysis we may conclude that: 
1.  The most significant sustainability gap of the three analyzed funds results from the 





































contribution  rates  combined  with  the  benefit  formula,  which  assumes  no  relation 
between the amounts of contributions and related benefit levels.  
2.  Due to recently observed stabilisation of the number of disabled beneficiaries, the 
survivors’ benefits shall follow their development and stabilize as well.  
3.  However, the increase in statutory retirement age introduced by the 1999 pension 
reform may encourage to seek for earlier retirement through disability benefits. On 
the basis of available data it is difficult to evaluate to which extent the legal system 
density prevents cheating with regard to disability benefits in a longer term. 
4.  Certainly, from a modeller’s point of view, survivors’ benefits should be derived from 
the  original  benefit  rather  than  from  the  development  of  currently  existing  micro-
profiles. 
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4.3. Social insurance scheme for farmers 
Farmers pension and disability system was formed in 1990, when it was separated from the 
ZUS insurance system. It is represented by the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS), 
which consists of 5 funds. One of them, Pension and Disability Fund (FER) was established 
for  pension  and  disability  resources  and  payments.  The  fund  covered  around  1.6  m  of 
insured persons and beneficiaries in the base year. Both figures started decreasing in recent 
years, as depicted in Figure 42: 
Figure 42: Number of insured persons and beneficiaries in FER, years 1991-2009 
 
Source: KRUS website 
Pension and disability contributions for farmers are paid quarterly, as a lump sum fixed at the 
level  of  30%
58  of  monthly  farmer’s  pension.  It  amounted  to  PLN  179  in  the  base  year. 
Farmer’s  pension  was  also  a  monthly  lump  sum  at  the  level  of  PLN  597  in  2007.  The 
consequence of significant disproportion between small amounts of paid contributions and 
much higher pensions and disability benefits is the high deficit of FER: its main source of 
revenues  are  current  transfers  from  the  state  budget,  which  cover  around  93%  of  all 
revenues, and only 6% comes from the contributions paid by farmers
59. However, it cannot 
be neglected that the deficit also results from the decreasing participation rates of younger 
cohorts in KRUS. Simply speaking, year by year fewer young persons choose to enter the 
farming sector. As a result, a decreasing number of contributors enter the KRUS-system. 
Hence,  not  only  demographics  and  the  benefit/contribution  structure  play  a  role  in  the 
financing of KRUS but also cohort specific participation rates. We shall come back later to 
this aspect. FER expenditures are mainly spent on pension and disability benefits. Some part 
of the state budget transfers for FER are redirected to the National Health Fund as substitute 
                                            
58 Amounting currently (June 2010) to 10% of basic farmer’s pension. 
59 Recently introduced reform, which aims at increase in contributions inflow from bigger and wealthier farms was 
not reflected in the computations due to lack of data. Starting from IV
th q2009, farmers, who own over 50 hectares 
(around 123 acres) of field, pay additional monthly contributions – progressing in accordance with growing area of 
owned land. Recent figure, which take into account the first effects of mentioned contribution raise suggest that 
pension and disability contributions may be even doubled (I
st q2010). 67 
 
of farmers’ health contributions. According to our assumptions on isolation, as in the case of 
ZUS, here we do not take into account other types of fiscal burdens paid by farmers to the 
state and local budgets (VAT, PIT, rural tax) or to the social insurance system (e.g. in the 
case of additional insurance in ZUS). Certainly, part of them, due to the decision of the state 
or local government on allocation of transfers is paid back to farmers. However, the amount 
of  government  support does  not  stand  in  direct  relation  with  the  amount  of  pension  and 
disability entitlement of an individual
60.  
Statutory retirement age for men is 65 and 60 for women. Though there are possibilities to 
retire earlier, by five years respectively, comparing to the general FUS system, both men and 
women insured in KRUS in principle tend to work (and contribute to KRUS) until the statutory 
retirement age. 
Pension  scheme  for  farmers  is  a  typical  unfunded  defined  benefit  scheme.  There  is  no 
correspondence  between  amounts  of  paid  contributions  and  level  of  benefits.  Pension 
benefits are paid as a lump sum, based on the criterion of sufficient number of contributory 
years in farmers’ scheme – 25 years for both men and women.  
4.3.1. Computation procedure for farmers’ pensions, disability, and 
survivors’ benefits 
The input data for the amounts of farmers’ pension and disability contributions were provided 
upon request by the Farmers’ Social Insurance Fund, in 6-year long, unisex cohorts. The 
extended,  gender-specific  profile  was  based  on  own  calculations  with  the  use  of 
Demographic Yearbook of Poland (2008, CSO). Data on the number of contributors were 
unavailable for the base year, so the original profile was divided per capita with nominal 
amounts  of  annual  contributions  (four  times  quarterly  contributions  per  insured  person), 
which  roughly  satisfied  the  aggregated  annual  inflow  of  farmers’  pension  and  disability 
contributions. 
The contribution side was developed according to the probabilities derived from the micro-
profile. The method of computation of the expenditures side of generational accounts for 
farmers (pensions, disability benefits and survivors’ benefits) is similar to ZUS disability and 
survivors’ benefits. On the basis of micro-profiles, provided upon request by the KRUS, the 
probability to become a beneficiary-farmer for newcomers was tackled separately
61. Micro 
profiles for existing beneficiaries as well as the newcomers were estimated on the basis of 
age and sex specific expenditures for single year cohorts and weighted with the population 
size.  
However, comparing with the other types of GA calculations one important change has been 
introduced to the new pensioners’ profile. Due to the observed process of outflow of farmers 
from the farming sector (here elaborated on the basis of the pace of a decreasing number of 
persons  insured  in  KRUS  in  years  2000-2007,  as  shown  in  Figure  42),  we  decided  to 
introduce a modification into the number of newcomers to the pension system each year. 
According  to  our  assumption,  which  in  principle follows  the  assumptions  of the  expertise 
                                            
60 In this respect our results do not stand in opposition to results of Soszyski (2009), who considers all fiscal 
revenues paid by farmers (e.g. VAT) and transfers received, as we consider only social contributions and all 
transfers received. The difference in interpretations and conclusions may stem from the different methodological 
approach. 
61 More details on the separation method in chapter on ‘Other types of social insurance provided by ZUS’. 68 
 
made  by  IAFE-NRI
62  (2009)  –  illustrated  in  further  detail  in  Figure  43  –  the  number  of 
persons  insured  in  KRUS  shall  fall  from  1.6  m
63  in  the  base  year  to  roughly  630,000  in 
2050.
64  
Figure 43: Projection of participation rates in KRUS pension system 
 
Source: own calculations 
In consequence we show two options: 1) the standard or the outflow scenario in which we 
assume an outflow of farmers across coming decades and 2) the non-outflow scenario in 
which the age-specific probabilities to be an insured person and a beneficiary in the base 
year remains unchanged in the future. Depending on the version, the ZUS pension fund was 
adjusted accordingly. In other words the outflow of farmers corresponds to an equal inflow to 
ZUS. Expected development of cash flows in both scenarios is plotted in Figure 44. It is 
interesting what a huge impact the outflow of insured persons has on the cash deficit of the 
fund – which gives yet more evidence of the ‘devastating’ effect of generous benefit formulas 
of the old type of social insurance system on the solvency of the social scheme. Even in the 
outflow scenario large disproportions between contributions and benefits can be spotted. 
                                            
62 Instrumenty oddziaływania Pastwa na kształtowanie struktury obszarowej gospodarstw rolnych w Polsce; rola 
systemu  ubezpieczenia  społecznego  rolników  w  kształtowaniu  tej  struktury.  Stan  obecny  i  rekomendacje  na 
przyszło oraz propozycje nowych rozwiza dotyczcych tego obszaru dla  systemu ubezpiecze rolników; 
expertise LED by A. Sikorska for the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Institute of Agricultural and 
Food Economics - National Research Institute (IAFE-NRI), 2009. 
63 KRUS website. 
64 This drop by 60 % can be partially explained by the decline of the working population in the coming decades. 
From 2007 to 2050 the overall size of the age groups 20 to 60 will shrink by roughly 35 %. The residual can be 
traced back to the drop of the participation rates in the farming sector and respectively in KRUS. We define this 
participation rate here more precisely as the ratio of overall insured in KRUS (whether pensioners or contributors) 
to the overall population – of the respective age groups. While this participation rate amounted to an average of 
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Figure 44: Development of FER revenues and expenditures. Scenarios with outflow and no-
outflow, (g=1.5, r=0), 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
4.3.2. Generational Accounts, Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators 
for farmers’ social benefits system 
The  GAs  for  farmers’  pension  and  disability  scheme,  plotted  in  Figure  45,  give  a  rather 
negative impression. Its shape reminds the ZUS pension no-1999-reform scenario. In fact, 
due to quite comparable benefit formula and additional deep underfunding, it shouldn’t be a 
surprise. In the case of expected outflow of younger cohorts to the ZUS system, the GAs 
give a better economic prospect – the younger the cohorts are, the better off they become (or 
rather less badly-off) in terms of sustainability gap. The reason is clear, a smaller proportion 
of the population is participating in the unsustainable KRUS pension system – see Figure 43. 
As a consequence GAs shrink in absolute terms for younger cohorts. For already retired 
farmers, however, the outflow of younger cohorts has no influence. Their participation rate is 















































Figure 45: Generational Accounts for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
As a second indicator we examine the sustainability gap. There are also two scenarios: one 
for the outflow or standard scenario and second for no-outflow. In the latter scenario the 
sustainability  gap  would  amount  to  roughly  60%  of  GDP.  With  the  outflow  of  farmers 
encouraged by higher average pensions to be expected from NDC/FDC, the fiscal gap would 
fall to 48% of GDP. Compared to other already analyzed isolated systems of ZUS, ‘weighted’ 
with their base year absolute amounts of expenditures, which are two or three times higher, 
the isolated farmers’ fund without government support induces a huge sustainability gap.  
Figure 46: Sustainability gap for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007, % of GDP 
 
Source: own calculations 
The next indicator, the FGB gives comparable impression to the previous one: depending on 
the magnitude of expected ‘migration’ of farmers to ZUS, the FGB indicates a considerable 
additional burden for future generations. A `theoretical´ newborn of 2008 would have to pay 

















































the intensity of the outflow of contributors to the NDC scheme. Whatever scenario is taken as 
preferred, the isolated farmers’ pension and disability fund is not sustainable. 
Figure 47: FGB for farmers’ pension and disability fund, 2007 
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4.4. Civil servants’ social benefits system 
The term “civil servants” in reference to the part of the social assistance system financed 
entirely from the state budget can be slightly misleading in Poland. Actually, it refers to two 
major groups of government employees: uniformed services and judges and prosecutors. In 
this system, there’s no separate pension scheme for all civil servants, i.e. central and local 
government employees in Poland, as in Germany or the UK. Polish system of social benefits 
paid to the abovementioned two groups of government employees is recognized, in recently 
updated worldwide system of national accounts
65, as a system of social assistance, and not 
as separate public social insurance system, due to the lack of social contributions paid by its 
members.  The  system  encompasses  uniformed  employees  of  the  Ministry  of  Defence, 
Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs,  Prison  Services,  firemen,  officers  of  Government  Protection 
Bureau, Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Central Anti-corruption Bureau, Polish 
Border  Guard,  custom  duties  services  and,  already  mentioned,  judges  and  prosecutors 
(Ministry of Justice). The amount of pension is set in reference to the last three (monthly) 
salaries before retirement. The minimum retirement age is not required, while a uniformed 
services employee may become a pensioner after 15 years of duty, though at that point the 
benefit is paid in a limited amount of 40% of full pension. It explains the cases of 36 year old 
pensioners in our micro-profiles! A longer working period increases the percentage of final 
salaries  taken  for  calculation  of  future  pensions  but  the  pension  cannot  exceed  75%  of 
average salaries from the last three months of duty. Each year after the 15
th year of duty 
adds to the retirement benefit an additional 2.6%, with lowered multipliers, if a civil servant 
worked outside the civil service. The maximum allowed percentage (75%) is applied if the 
civil  servant  collected  the  sufficient  amount  of  years  in  civil  service,  according  to  the 
described formula. 
4.4.1. Computation procedure for civil servants’ pensions, disability, and 
survivors’ benefits 
Computation procedure was based on profiles provided by the Ministries supervising specific 
civil servants for the purpose of the AWG inputs, and for each type of service and benefit the 
probabilities of retirement behaviours were derived. The procedure was similar for the one 
applied for e.g. disability fund beneficiaries.  
The main features of the concept of isolation of civil servants social benefits system was 
described in the introduction to the chapters on isolated parts of public finances. The main 
methodological issue to be solved referred to the lack of social contributions, which excludes 
the possibility to treat the revenue side of the civil servants’ system as in the case of e.g. 
farmers’ pension and disability scheme. Nevertheless, the authors decided to assume that 
the  amount  necessary  to  cover  the  base  year  expenditures  could  be  treated  as 
“contributions”. This aggregate of revenues matching the sum of expenditures in the base 
year was spread equally across all members of the population. In other words, we assumed 
that every Polish citizen contributes the same amount to the pension system of civil servants, 
resulting in a flat per capita of population ‘contribution’ profile. This can be regarded as a 
relatively conservative assumption since civil servants are paid from the overall revenues of 
the government and these revenues do not necessarily follow a flat profile.
66 Our aim was to 
check if the years following the base year revenues – as defined above – will be sufficient to 
                                            
65 SNA2008 
66 For example incomes taxes are mostly paid by cohorts of the working population.  73 
 
balance the expected social assistance benefits paid to civil servants. In this respect the 
methodology of isolation is different from the other so far analyzed schemes, which makes 
comparison  between  the  subsystems  described  so  far  more  difficult.  Despite  this  looser 
methodological comparability between civil servants and other schemes the authors decided 
to share findings of the analyses of the system, which distributed ca. PLN 11 bn of social 
benefits in the base year.
67 
4.4.2. Generational Accounts for civil servants’ social benefits system 
Figure  48  shows  GAs  for  civil  servants  social  benefits  system.  Bearing  in  mind 
methodological limitations of the base year revenue side, we see that despite there being no 
deficit in the base year, the system tends to pay much more than it ‘receives’ in the long 
run.
68. It is also interesting, that in comparison to other pension systems, cohorts aged 50 
show the highest (negative) level of GAs. In other systems such as farmers or ZUS these are 
the age groups of 55 years. Negative values on its own do not show whether the system 
analyzed is in any bad or good shape since only future net payments after the base year are 
taken into account. The fact that people aged 50 show the highest (negative) level of GAs is 
simply  a  result  of  early  effective  retirement  ages.  The  system  in  its  current  pattern  is 
relatively generous for civil servants who retire at the age of 60/65. Retirement at a statutory 
age gives a guaranteed pension at the level of 75% of averaged three last salaries. Just for 
comparison, in ZUS an average NDC/FDC pension in relation to eventual salary is estimated 
at a level of roughly 50% – which varies, however, by gender and birth year.
69 Our results 
might underestimate (life-cycle) benefits of civil servants. One reason is that we do not take 
into account the fact that this employee group often shows longer life expectancies than the 
general population. 
                                            
67 Civil servant schemes generally show wave of employment. In other words due to policy changes one can 
observe  that  some  years  show  a  large  increase  of  newly  employed  civil  servants.  As  a  consequence,  the 
population of civil servants does not follow the general population structure. Due to a lack of data we could not 
take this into account. Future research should base on the actual population of civil servants – as it has been 
done for example by Benz and Hagist (2010) – in order get more precise results. Also a further differentiation of 
longevity of different groups assessed could improve the accuracy of our estimations. Generally, it is presumed 
that the life expectancy of civil servants varies considerably from the average in the population. A follow up study 
could take this into account – given the availability of data.  
68 Here it should be noticed that our results might underestimate (life-cycle) benefits of civil servants. Generally, it 
is presumed that the life expectancy of civil servants is higher than the average in the population. A follow up 
study could take this into account – given the availability of data. Also a further consideration of the actual civil 
servants´  population could  enhance  the accuracy  of results.  Civil  servant  schemes generally  show  waves  of 
employment. In other words due to policy changes one can observe that some years feature a large increase of 
newly employed civil servants. As a consequence, the population of civil servants does not follow the general 
population structure. Due to a lack of data we could not take this into account. Future research should base on 
the actual population of civil servants – as it has been done for example by Benz and Hagist (2010) – in order to 
get more precise results. 
69  See  Chlon-Dominczak  (2006).  Of  course,  one  could  put  forward  in  this  context  that  relatively  higher 
replacement rates of civil servants are offset by lower salaries and stiffer career paths in the public sector. 74 
 
Figure 48: Generational Accounts for civil servants social benefits system, 2007, in thousand 
PLN, r=3%, g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
In conclusion: Very long retirement period, comparable to the retirement period of miners, 
together  with  generous  pension  formula,  yet  again  boosted  by  the  ageing  population 
process, may be the explanation of the highly unsustainable GA of civil servants.  
4.4.3. Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for civil servants’ social 
benefits system 
The sustainability gap for civil servants amounts to 14% of GDP. Though this value is not 
very significant, when interpreting it we shall remember that it refers to the system which is 
balanced in the base year, and its participants are not in the group which deserves special 
attention  from  the  point  of  view  of  state  social  assistance  policy  measures  provided  to 
persons  incapable  to  work.  Furthermore,  a  sustainability  gap  of  14%  is  remarkable, 
considering  that  expenditures  for  civil  servants  amount  only  to  roughly  2%  of  overall 
government expenditures in 2008. 
Our next standard indicator to be examined is the FGB in the case of isolated civil servants’ 
scheme. The results are quite clear: if we prolong the legal status quo and maintain the per 
capita  “contributions”  to  the  civil  servants  scheme  of  present  generations  constant,  a 
considerable intergenerational redistribution is generated. Again we want to take a closer 
look at a representative of future generations, a cohort member born one year after the base 
year  (-1  year  old).  He/she  would  have  to  pay  significantly  higher  net-taxes  over  his/her 
lifecycle in comparison to an individual born in the base year. The difference in GAs between 
these two cohorts amounts to roughly PLN 11,000. Regarding a low probability to be a civil 























Figure 49: FGB for civil servants, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
Finally, we will tackle the revenue and transfer gap, our ultimate sustainability indicators. If 
the state intended to close the sustainability gap for civil servants with a raise of the tax 
inflow, this revenue side would have to be increased by 30%. A cut of 25% of benefits (of 
future and present generations) could respectively bridge the sustainability gap. We may 
conclude then the results of the computations of the isolated civil servants’ social benefits 
system as follows: 
1.  Despite the fact that in our approach to isolation the system is balanced in cash terms 
in  the  base  year,  the  long  term  financing  of  the  civil  servants  scheme  is  not 
sustainable.  
2.  One of the main reasons for this long term fiscal imbalance lies in the privileges of 
civil  servants  to  retire  even  sooner  than  miners,  which  in  consequence  on  the 
average results in very long retirement periods. 
3.  An  additional  factor  undermining  the  sustainability  of  this  scheme  is  a  relatively 
generous ratio between the final salaries and expected pension amount. 
4.  The proposed reform to phase out the civil servants’ social benefits system and to 
integrate them in the general system would lead to a clear improvement of Polish 





















Box 3: Reform of the civil servants‘ social benefits scheme 
In the recently discussed option of the reforms of the civil servants’ social benefits system, the concept 
to hire them as standard employees was put forward, to be introduced for each new civil servant hired 
from 2012 onward. Following, we want to briefly sketch out the effects of such a successive phase out 
of the civil servants pension system and the consequential phase-in in ZUS. But first it has to be 
underlined  that  the  reform  computation  outlined  here  is  of  a  very  rough  nature  and  further  data 
elaboration is required to ensure improved accuracy.  
What had to be modelled? First, we computed an outflow of participants in the civil servants social 
benefits  scheme.  The  impact  of  this  side  was  relatively  simple  to  compute.  We  allowed  no  new 
entrants from 2012 onwards – taking the simplifying assumption that the average age to start a civil 
servants career is 21 (which represents a weighted average of the uniformed services). In line with 
this process we let the existing civil servants and beneficiaries to keep their privileges until they die. Of 
course, the impact on expenditures is visible not until later years, after 2030 – as depicted in Figure 50 76 
 
below. Not until this year would new entrants of the civil servants system receive any benefits without 
the reform.  
Figure 50: Development of old age pensions expenditures for civil servants, r=0%, g=1.5% 
 
To model on the other side the inflow of civil servants into ZUS requires far more assumptions to be 
taken as well as data to be collected. First of all the number of new contributors entering ZUS instead 
of the civil servants social benefits scheme has to be estimated. Of course, this depends on future 
hiring policies. We adopted the assumption that a constant proportion of the population chooses to 
become and is hired as civil servants – which amounts to roughly one percent of each cohort. This 
number reflects the ratio of present active civil servants to working population. Furthermore, the social 
contributions basis has to be estimated. Here first of all the average level of salaries for different 
groups of civil servants should be gathered. Additionally, it has to be decided whether these salaries 
are increased due to the reform. Here two options are imaginable:  
•  gross salary (e.g. soldier’s pay) corrected for growth until 2012 (starting year of the reform) – 
which in consequence would decrease significantly the civil servants’ salaries and as a result, 
certainly cause social and political tensions; 
•  gross salary increased by the amount of social insurance burden: so in addition to current 
level of gross salaries a civil servant would receive from the state additional reimbursement of 
the social contributions paid to the NDC.  
Due to restrictions of data and resources we took the assumption that civil servants entering ZUS 
have a salary comparably to the average of ZUS contributors. Of course, this is simplified approach 
and therefore the results of this exercise should be taken with cautiousness, e.g. according to our 
estimates the average salaries of judges are well above 250% of the average salary in the economy. 
With  the  reform  civil  servants  are  treated  like  common  ZUS  contributors.  In  other  words,  NDC 
accounts are applied and also the same retirement probabilities are considered. Of course, in this 
outflow scenario the probability to be a ZUS contributor changes – but only rather gradually: every 
year (from 2012 onwards) one more cohort is not entering the civil servants social benefits scheme but 
ZUS instead. But not until 2055 will all active civil servants be members of ZUS. This explains why the 

































































































































































































































Figure 51: Development expenditures/revenues inflow of civil servants into ZUS, r=0%, g=1.5% 
 
According  to  our  very  rough  estimates  the  savings  for  general  government  are  nevertheless 
substantial: the sustainability gap would decrease from 228% to 210% of GDP in the case of the 
proposed reform. But it has to be underlined that the accuracy of results can be clearly improved. 
Future research should apply e.g. more precise data on the number of working civil servants and their 
actual wages and compute different scenarios such as: 1) constant and 2) increased gross salary (by 
































































































































4.5. The healthcare system 
Historically,  the  state  budget  was  responsible  for the  provision  of  healthcare  services  in 
Poland. After the introduction of the healthcare reform in 1999 the structure of healthcare 
financing has changed:  
•  National Healthcare Fund (NFZ) - the government self-financing entity, developed in 
a few  organisational  stages,  is responsible for contracting  the  healthcare  services 
with public healthcare units.  
•  Central government provides healthcare oriented programmes and local governments 
finance the operational costs of public healthcare units at local level. 
The  NFZ  budget  plan  has  to  be  balanced  by  law.  The main  source  of financing  of  NFZ 
expenditures are healthcare contributions. But there are other revenues as well: 
•  Revenues from the state government for tasks commissioned by the state budget in 
respect of the governmental health programmes; 
•  healthcare  contributions  (in  fact  state  budget  transfers)  for:  unemployed  persons, 
beneficiaries of maternity leave, and additionally for farmers, rerouted via KRUS.  
In the case of already analysed isolated subsystems, e.g. disability fund, the amount of the 
state budget support depends on the discretionary decision of the government. The part of 
contributions  transmitted  to  the  NFZ  paid  by  the  state  budget,  and  not  directly  by  the 
contributors, was treated separately from ´normal´ NFZ-contributions.
70  
The  overall  amount  of  healthcare  expenditures  of  the  NFZ  amounted  to  40  bn  in  2007. 
Additionally,  state  budget  expenditures  amounted  to  almost  5  bn,  of  which  2.5  bn  on 
healthcare contributions paid to e.g. farmers and unemployed persons, transferred to NFZ. 
The  remaining  2.5  bn  of  the  state  budget  expenditures  were  spent  mainly  on  capital 
investments in hospitals, public blood service, professional medicine, government healthcare 
and prevention programmes as well as medical education. Local government expenditures 
amounted to around 3 bn, half of which was spent on maintenance costs of the hospitals. All 
COFOG healthcare expenditures in 2007 amounted to around 54 bn, of which 41 bn were 
broken into micro-profiles, and covered in our computations. The remaining 13 bn cover to 
some extent the LTC expenditures, and definitely call for improvement of the computations.
71 
4.5.1. Computation procedure for the healthcare system 
The  number  of  insured  persons  in  the  NFZ  in  some  cohorts  exceeds  the  number  of 
population size. The obligatory healthcare insurance is provided to all social groups so apart 
from contributors the healthcare insurance is extended to the members of the contributor’s 
family, who do not have taxable sources of income, e.g. children. In our approach to isolation 
we decided to verify if the system is sustainable with support of actual contributors and the 
base year state budget support. The only micro profile available on the healthcare system 
contributors was provided by ZUS, which transmits the healthcare contributions to NFZ for 
ZUS contributors. The number of retired contributors was estimated on the basis of an old 
age-pension micro-profile provided by ZUS. According to our estimates the relation of the 
                                            
70 Similar to the tax inflow in the civil servants´ social benefits system we assumed here a flat revenue- profile. In 
other words, the relatively little inflow of state budget support to NFZ (2.5 bn, in 2007) was spread equally over all 
age groups of the Polish population.  
71 For the remaining part of health care expenditures we assumed – due to a lack of age specific micro data – a 
flat profile. We presume that this will lead to a considerable underestimation of implicit liabilities in the public 
health care sector.  79 
 
number of healthcare contributors to the number of persons insured in the NFZ amounts to 
46%.  
Figure 52: Number of insured persons and actual healthcare contributors, 2007 
 
Source: NFZ, ZUS and own calculations 
The amounts of healthcare contributions for the working population was derived from the age 
and gender specific gross income micro-profile, which has already served as a starting point 
for our NDC pension calculation. Healthcare contributions are paid obligatorily by all working 
individuals  on  the  basis  of  taxable  income  (gross  income  after  the  deduction
72  of  social 
insurance  contributions).  In  consequence,  for  the  working  population  and  pensioners 
(excluding farmers) the nominal healthcare contribution rate is set at the level of 9%, but the 
effective rate amounted to around 7% of the average gross income in the base year. Due to 
lowered  disability  contribution  rates  paid  to  ZUS,  the  average  effective  healthcare 
contribution rates increased slightly. According to our estimates, in the base year the working 
population paid contributions to the NFZ amounting to around 34 bn, and pensioners nearly 6 
bn. As a source of data for healthcare contributions paid by ZUS beneficiaries we took the 
average  (age  and  gender  specific)  pensions,  disability  benefits  and  survivors’  benefits. 
Different effective healthcare contribution rates were applied accordingly, since pensions are 
not a basis of social contributions’ burden, so the effective healthcare rates are slightly higher 
than those of the working population
73. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that we applied 
effective rates based on ‘old’ PIT rates, which certainly biases our results. Our estimates of 
NFZ revenues from different groups of population are shown in Table 3: 
  
                                            
72 In case of pensioners the basis for calculation of healthcare contributions is gross pension (if it’s the only 
source  of  income  of  a  pensioner).  Social  insurance  burden  is  in  principle  not  imposed  on  pensions.  In 
consequence, the average effective healthcare contribution rate for pensioners is higher as well than the one 
estimated for working population salaries. 
73 This is not very precise expression, since we applied effective PIT rates based on average of 3 existing taxation 
rates in 2007 (19%, 30% and 40%). According to our estimates, the PIT revenues based on these rates cover 
only 72% of all tax payers, defined here as working population. Our effective rates do not take the remaining part 
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Table 3: NFZ revenues for different groups of the population, 2007, in billion PLN 
NFZ work  34,5 
NFZ pensions  3,2 
NFZ disability  1,3 
NFZ survivors  1,4 
total NFZ  40,3 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 53: Healthcare contributions per capita of population, 2007, PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
The healthcare expenditures were divided into several categories,: hospital treatment (18.6 
bn), basic medical healthcare (4.7 bn), specialized ambulatory care (3.1 bn), dental treatment 
(1.3 bn), medical specialist services (1.0 bn), and long term care (LTC) (0.7 bn).  
The micro profiles for particular healthcare categories were created as follows:  
We used the households survey on healthcare spending (CSO, 2006), annual report of the 
NFZ  (2006,  2007,  2008,  NFZ),  and  source  data  provided  upon  request  by  NFZ  on  the 
average per capita cost of selected categories of healthcare treatment. Statistical survey on 
healthcare served as a source of information on the number of patients for each type of 
healthcare  treatment,  e.g.  for  each  type  of  treatment  the  age  and  gender  specific  multi-
annual  cohorts  from  the  survey  were  divided  into  one-year  cohorts,  assuming  they  are  
representative for the respective cohorts of the entire population.  
For cohort specific cost the dynamics of per patient costs was created on the basis of data 
provided by the NFZ. Then, the received growth was applied for each type of healthcare 
treatment costs
74.  
                                            
74 Average per patient treatment varies for each type of service, per patient cost in 2007: hospital treatment 
(4710PLN),  outpatient  LTC  (2165PLN),  specialised  medical  consultations  (419PLN),  basic  medical  care 
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Figure 54: NFZ expenditures costs per capita of population, 2007, PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
As  stated  in  the  chapter  on  assumptions  and  data,  the  micro-profiles  of  healthcare 
expenditures  in  Poland  follow,  in  general,  the  patterns  of  comparable  profiles  in  OECD 
countries
75. In comparison to AWG2009
76  our profile for Poland seems steeper. Another 
important feature is the proportion of hospital treatment to the sum of total healthcare costs: 
in the case of Poland this share amounts to almost 47% in the base year and is the mostly 
dominant  category  of  all  types  of  costs  of  medical  care.  Putting  together  the  two 
abovementioned  observations,  it  becomes  clear  that hospital  treatment  of  elderly  people 
represents  a  large  proportion  of  present  health  care  expenditures.  Bearing  in  mind  the 
growing share of older persons in the Polish society in the coming decades we can expect a 
significant raise in healthcare and especially in hospital treatment expenditures.  
4.5.2. Generational Accounts for the NFZ 
The authors are well aware of the uncertainty about future healthcare expenditures. This 
regards especially our assumption of a constant health care profile over time (see box 4). 
Therefore, the following results should be taken with a touch of caution.  
                                            
75 See Hagist (2008).  
76 See Ageing Report 2009, European Commission. 
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Box 4: Constant age-specific profiles – a reasonable assumption?
77 
A  crucial  assumption  of  the  analysis  is  that  the  age-specific  distribution  of  (public)  healthcare 
expenditure per capita remains constant over time. In the following we will call this the status quo 
hypothesis. However, economic literature in this field is relatively controversial. Mainly, there are two 82 
 
First of all Figure 55 shows isolated GAs for NFZ healthcare the in base year in the standard 
scenario (status quo), and it gives a pretty sobering impression. All newborns receive the 
starting package of medical services mostly in hospital, so the probability to be its beneficiary 
is  relatively  high  at  this  age.  The  cohorts  who  are  expected  to  contribute  to  the  system 
almost as much as get back (over their remaining life cycle), are those aged between 15 and 
25. At first sight it might be surprising, that already cohorts aged 30 are receiving more than 
cohorts aged 15-25. Here it has to be underlined that generational accounts observe cohorts 
over their remaining life cycle. In other words the probability that cohorts aged 30 today will 
feature increasing health costs when getting older is taken here already into account.
78 This 
explains  higher  negative  value  of  population  aged  30,  than  those  aged  15.  Of  course, 
generational accounts drop further – here until the age of 65 – due to the fact that health 
expenditures (contributions) increase (decrease) with age. After the age of 65 GAs rise up 
again mainly due to increasing mortality – which lowers the probability to receive relatively 
high benefits at ages 65+. But of course, this is also due to the fact that only future revenues 
and benefits are taken into account. So e.g. for a 90 year only medical expenses over his/her 
relatively short remaining life cycle are considered in the GAs.  
                                            
78 Of course, due to discounting – or more precisely due to the residual of discount and growth rate amounting to 
above zero – the further we step away from the base year the less do future net-tax payments play a role for 
value of generational accounts. Hence for the 30 year old in the base year his/her health care expenditures in 50 
years, being then 80, are of minor importance for the value of generational account of the today. 
contradicting hypotheses regarding the outcome of the age specific distribution when life expectancy 
of the old population (60 years and more) increases. The first one is the so-called medicalization 
hypothesis  which  goes  back  to  Verbrugge  (1984).  In  this  scenario,  due  to  the  observed  multi-
morbidity  of  elderly  patients,  certain  treatments  (e.g.  for  heart  diseases)  prolong  the  life  without 
restoring  the  health  of  the  patient  fully.  This  leads  to  further  treatment  in  the  case  of  another 
disease. As a result, it induces a “steeping” of the age-specific health expenditure profile with an 
increasing life expectancy controlling for the effect of medical-technical progress. In this case we 
would  underestimate  the  demographic  effect  on  the  growth  of  public  health  care  expenditure 
because we would neglect this shift with our assumption of constant profiles. The other scenario is 
the  so-called  compression  hypothesis  which  was  first  formulated  by  Fries  (1980).  Under  this 
scenario, observed differences in health expenditure per capita in different age groups are not due 
to the calendar age but to the remaining lifetime to death. Old cohorts simply cost more because 
they are more likely to die and not because they are old per se. If the life expectancy of the elderly 
increases, the costs which they will cause will just be shifted into the future, controlled for the effect 
of the medical-technical progress. The age-specific distribution would become flatter over time. In 
this case, we would overestimate the demographic effect on the growth of governmental outlays on 
health. Both hypotheses are controversial and both lack sufficient empirical evidence. Fetzer (2006) 
has shown that in the case of Germany, the results of a Generational Accounting analysis are not 
strongly  influenced  by  the  choice  of  the  underlying  scenario  with  differences  of  8.8  percentage 
points between the compression and status quo hypothesis and 25.5 percentage points between the 
status quo and medicalization hypothesis regarding the sustainability gap. To summarize: applying 
the status quo hypothesis, i.e. the assumption of constant age-specific profiles of health expenditure 
to forecast future health care outlays or to calculate Generational Accounts is connected with a great 
deal of uncertainty. However, as long as evidence is mixed, it seems to be a reasonable assumption 
and a suitable approximation for current research. 83 
 
Figure 55: Generational Accounts for NFZ, g=1.5%, r=3,0%, 2007, in thousand PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
The next Figure 55 shows GA with additional reference to cost pressure. In this scenario we 
assume that the growth of health care expenditures per capita is higher than GDP growth per 
capita. For a background of this scenario see box 5. If this scenario turned into reality, then 
all cohorts would go on much deeper to the ‘dark side’: even relatively well performing young 
and  healthy  20-25  years’  old  contributors  shall  become  net  recipients  of  the  healthcare 
system for the amount of over PLN 20,000. The older the cohorts become, the smaller the 
impact of the cost pressure that can be spotted due to a shorter remaining lifetime period.  
                                            





















Box 5: The scenario of medical-technical progress 
Current literature reveals that the rise in health care expenditures can only partly be attributed to the 
ageing process, see e.g. Dormont et al. (2006). Some research such as Breyer und Ulrich (2000) 
show that it is also determined by the so called medical-technical progress. This judgment is based 
on  the  assumption  that  innovations  occurring  in  the  health  care  sector  are  relatively  one-sided. 
Generally it is assumed that costly product innovations dominate cost-saving process innovations.
79 
The ensuing effect is that the healthcare system is able to offer new, and often costly methods and 
tools  to  cure  diseases.  However,  due  to  a  lack  of  process  innovations  it  is  lagging  behind  the 
efficiency of other sectors in the economy. As a result (per capita) health care expenditures tend to 
grow at a faster pace than the general productivity growth. Breyer und Ulrich (2000) estimate for 
Germany a growth-differential of 1 %. Hagist and Kottlikoff (2009) calculate for 10 OECD countries a 
growth differential of at least 1 % for each country. 
For  our  computations  in  the  medical-technical  progress  scenario  –  also  called  cost  pressure 
scenario – we assume a growth of medical expenses per capita of one percent above the general 
economic growth. However, we limit this higher growth path until the year 2040. After this point in 
time health care expenditures follow our standard growth assumptions in the long run. The rationale 
for  this  time  limit  is  a  logical  one:  If  we  were  not  to  limit  the  higher  growth  path,  health  care 
expenditures would outweigh the Polish GDP in the long run.  84 
 
In fact, the GAs with cost pressure give the most grim sustainability perspective of all the so 
far analysed isolated subsystems in absolute terms. What may worry policy makers even 
more is the fact that in comparison to the ‘cash deficit’ in the base year of e.g. other already 
isolated sub-systems, e.g. farmers pension and disability fund (93%) or ZUS disability fund 
(41%),  the  NFZ  is  actually  balanced,  but  for  a  small  part  of  contributions  paid  from  the 
budget. It becomes clear that policy makers will most probably have to decide in the coming 
decades between a rise of health care revenues – via higher contribution rates and/or extra 
budget funding– and further reform measures to close the fiscal gaps.
80  
Figure 56: Generational Accounts for NFZ with additional cost pressure scenario, g=1.5%, 
r=3.0%, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
4.5.3. Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for the NFZ 
As  we  expected,  our  first  indicator,  the  sustainability  gap  depicted  in  Figure  57  for  both 
considered scenarios shows significant level of unsustainability, amounting to 83% of GDP in 
the case of standard scenario and roughly a doubled amount (158% of GDP) in the case of 
the  costs  pressure  scenario.  Again,  if  we  compare  overall  level  of  own  (isolated)  NFZ 
revenues, expenditures and deficit with categories of already examined social security funds, 
we may conclude that the healthcare system in its current shape tends to be one of the most 
unsustainable sub-systems of all taken into consideration in our exercise on isolations. 
                                            
80  Recent  research  see  e.g.  Garber  and  Skinner  (2008),  has  shown  that  an  advancement  of  cost-benefit 
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Figure 57: Sustainability gaps for NFZ with additional cost pressure scenario, g=1.5%, r=3.0%, 
2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
The FGB for NFZ is another indicator pointing out the significant unfunded part of future 
expenditures. Figure 58 makes clear that a continuation of the present fiscal policy would 
imply a significant burden on future generations. Taking the indicator of FGB, a newborn 
after the base year would have to pay roughly PLN 50,000 more than its present counterpart. 
In case of cost pressure scenario this amount is more than doubled to over PLN 110,000. 
Figure 58: FGB for NFZ, with additional cost pressure scenario, g=1.5%, r=3.0%, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
Additionally,  we  want  to  present  indicators  showing  how  revenues/transfers  have  to  be 
changed in order to close the sustainability gap. Being this a rather theoretical and reference 
possibility,  the  healthcare  services  contracted  by NFZ  with  public  healthcare  units  would 
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addition, we calculated the necessary change in nominal healthcare contribution rate, which 
would guarantee NFZ sustainability, as plotted in Figure 59. So, in the standard scenario the 
raise  of  the  contribution  rate  required  to  close  the  sustainability  gap  would  lead  to  an 
increase of nominal rates from the current 9% to 12% in 2035, and almost 15% in 2050. Not 
surprisingly, with faster-than-GDP pace of growth of the healthcare costs, the contribution 
rates would have to be doubled in 2042, and will keep growing to over 20% in 2050.  
Figure 59: Development of healthcare contribution rate closing sustainability gap, 2007, 
g=1.5%, r=3% 
 
Source: own calculations 
Before we summarize our results a few remarks shall be made regarding the LTC data. Our 
input  data  for  LTC  refer  only  to  the  part  of  the  LTC  care  in  Poland  paid  from  the  NFZ, 
amounting to a rather insignificant amount of 0.7 bn. In addition to the out- and in-patient 
services there are more LTC services provided by several local government institutions, for 
the amount of around 4 bn. These inputs are not considered in our computations due to the 
lack of source data. Comparing to all other types of healthcare services represented by the 
NFZ expenditures, the in-patient LTC is the smallest category, but on the other side, the 
profile of costs between consecutive cohorts, aged 60/65 and over, is even steeper than in 
the case of e.g. hospital treatment. According to our findings, the in-patient LTC seems to 
increase the health care expenditures more than other forms of healthcare treatment. From 
the point of view of the obtained results we suppose that the inclusion of the mentioned 
missing 4 bn into the in-patient profile would significantly increase sustainability gaps.
81 So 
far these costs are considered in the residual profile for other types of healthcare services, 
with flat per capita cost. Hence, our calculations can be regarded in this sense as relatively 
conservative. In addition to this observation we could expect that governmental programmes, 
which aim at increasing the range of in-patient care provided by the state (now provided in 
principle by the families) will have to be carefully examined in terms of respective financing. 
Further  research  could  examine  the  fiscal  impact  of  a  rise  of  in-patient  care  to  the  EU-
average. In 2007 only 0.6% of elderly people (aged 60+) have been cared for in nursing 
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homes in Poland. Other EU-countries such as Sweden (7.2%), Netherlands (5%) or Spain 
(3.4%) showed significantly higher levels. One explanation of these differences lies in the 
older population of EU15 countries. Incidence probabilities of LTC usually increase with age. 
So there are simply more very old individuals (aged 75+) who are more likely to be in the 
LTC. But also the relatively low ratios of working population to very old population (75+) in 
Western countries can explain the high proportion of in-patient LTC. There are simply fewer 
young cohorts to care for their relatives at home. With the significant rise of the old-age 
dependency ratio in Poland one can therefore expect also a convergence to the EU level of 
in-patient LTC. Additionally, the probability to be cared for at home in Poland can be affected 
by  social  changes.  With  higher  female  participation  rates  and  higher  divorce  rates  or 
increase  in  single  person  households  one  can  expect  that  fewer  people  care  for  their 
relatives at home, which could additionally increase the nursing home care. But of course, 
also the changes of the legal framework will determine the development of the future LTC in 
Poland. 
Figure 60: Development of long term care profiles, per capita, 2006 
 
Source: own calculations on basis of the OECD data (2006) 
The initial conclusion of our examination of the isolated NFZ sub-system may be summarized 
as follows:  
1.  Despite a balanced budget in the base year the system of provision of healthcare 
services  tends  to  be  one  of  the  most  unsustainable  of  all  analysed,  isolated 
subsystems. 
2.  The main reason for the significant sustainability gap is the combined effect of health 
care  profiles  increasing  steeply  with  age  and  the  ageing  population  process. 
Additionally,  cost  pressure  induced  by  medical-technical  progress  can  have  a 
considerable impact on fiscal sustainability. 
3.  LTC can be a potential source of growing costs in the case of higher participation of 
governmental programmes in this field. Further research should focus more on this 
increasingly important part of public finances.  
4.  Better  availability  of  the  source  data  would  significantly  improve  the  precision  of 
computation. Also a closer comparison and exchange of data and assumptions taken 
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4.6. Education 
The system of education in Poland was founded in its current shape in accordance to the 
educational reform of 1999. Youngsters after kindergartens, which last from the age of three 
to the age of six, enter the primary schools (for six years) and then the junior high schools 
(for  three  years).  From  age  of  16  the  secondary  education  starts  in  three-year  general 
lyceums or in vocational specialized lyceums (these are dramatically loosing new entrants) 
as  well  as  four-year  long  secondary  technical  schools.  The  certificate  of  secondary 
education,  issued  after  the  secondary  school-leaving  exam,  permits  to  access  higher 
education. There is a possibility to graduate after two or three years from basic vocational 
schools that teach selected craftsmanship professions. The basic vocational schools do not 
give  access  to  higher  education.  The  graduates  of  these  schools  may  continue  their 
education in a complementary lyceum or a complementary technical secondary school. After 
having graduated in one of these two, the secondary school-leaving exam completion allows 
to enter the higher education level. 
In  2007  all  expenditures  on  education  amounted  to  over  66  bn,  according  to  COFOG 
methodology. State budget expenditures amounted to 45 bn, of which almost 31 bn were 
financed from the state budget subsidies to local government. Expenditures from the local 
budgets on education amounted to 22 bn. In fact, the financing of the primary and secondary 
education system is carried out by local governments.  
Higher education starts most often at the age of 19 and lasts in most cases for 5 years. The 
system consists of public and privately owned universities and higher professional schools. 
General government expenditures on tertiary education amounted to almost 19 bn. Some 
revenues of public universities were earned from own activities.
82 As stated in the chapter 
devoted  to  data,  assumptions  [and  computation  procedures],  due  to  the  high  share  of 
persons aged over 19 in the complementary educational system, two separate profiles for 
education  were  elaborated,  reflecting  merged  primary  and  secondary  education,  and 
separately higher education. 
Input data for education was prepared on the same basis as civil servants, where in the base 
year the revenues were set exactly at a level to balance expenditures. Aggregate numbers 
for  expenditures  (and  consequently  revenues)  were  based  on  COFOG  education 
expenditures in general government. 
4.6.1. Generational Accounts for education 
Figure 61 depicts the GA for education in Poland. The picture looks as one would expect: 
younger cohorts are net-beneficiaries of the education system. Similar to e.g. the pension 
system,  education  is  based  on  a generational  contract,  which  is  reversed,  however,  with 
respect to the common “agreement” between generations. Here the older cohorts are paying 
for younger ones. It is interesting that already cohorts aged 15 are net-tax payers. Of course, 
this is due to the fact that we observe all age groups over their remaining life cycle. So also 
future relatively high tax payments, i.e. “contributions” to the education system are taken into 
                                            
82 As in the case of civil servants we apply here a flat tax profile. Of course, for some part of revenues, namely 
university fees, such a flat profile represents a simplification. But since university fees stand only for a very minor 




83 All cohorts aged over 25 who on average finished their education, contribute (net) 
extensively to the education system.  
Figure 61: Generational Accounts for education, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
On its own, Figure 61 does not give any indication of sustainability or lack of it. For such an 
assessment we have to take into account cohort sizes. In other words, it has to be examined 
how many net-beneficiaries correspond to the relevant number of net-taxpayers. Knowing 
the expected demographic development, the outlook for the Polish education system is quite 
bright – in fiscal terms. If present per capita costs and revenues of the education system 
remained constant over time considerable assets or savings could be generated. For the 
standard demographic scenario they would amount to about 79% of GDP (in present value) 
see Figure 62. Of course, one could argue that in comparison to other fiscal systems future 
education expenditures are highly sensitive to assumptions on fertility. While e.g. future old 
age pensioners of the coming six decades are already alive and therefore countable today, 
this is not the case for future pupils. But – as Figure 62 outlines – even when assuming 
significantly  higher/lower  fertility  rates  outcomes  are  relatively  stable  in  qualitative  and 
quantitative terms.  
                                            
83 But of course it plays also a role that an average Pole has a relatively high probability to profit from primary and 























Figure 62: Sustainability gap for education, different fertility scenarios, 2007, r=3%, g=1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
In other words, if revenues from the base year were left unchanged overtime, in the following 
years  the  education  system  would  have  significantly  more  resources  for  providing  its 
services. The reason for this expected surplus of the system lies in demographic changes. 
Due to the decreasing fertility rate, which started after the baby boomers period of the 80’s, 
the following generations who start their education, are becoming less numerous – see the 
following Figure 63:  
Figure 63: Different fertility rate options 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
The systemic financial requirements, and probably the infrastructure as well, decreases, if we 
assumed unchanged costs per pupil. Under this assumption combined with the presumption 
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generates a considerable surplus. Certainly, a cost analysis should follow to verify to which 
extent the cost of education remains adequate in relation to expected effects. It may happen 
that the expected savings in the education system could be used for higher expenditure per 
pupil to meet the expected educational standards. Nevertheless, it seems that at least a re-
allocation of sources shall be envisaged towards higher per capita spending for educational 
purposes, since the level of overfunding is significant.
84 Concluding, the message from our 
exercise sent to policy makers and local governments seems clear: considerable savings in 
the  education  system  can  be  expected  due  to  demographic  changes.  How  these  future 
assets shall be allocated in the system of public finances, has to be decided by politicians. 
Recent  research,  however,  indicates  that  it  is  advisable  to  use  some  part  of  the 
“demographic asset” for higher education spending.  
4.6.2. Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators for education 
Other sustainability indicators confirm the initial observations about the direction of financing 
in  the  educational  system.  Contrary  to  almost  all  analyzed  isolated  sub-systems,  the 
educational system, with its current financing requirements unchanged, creates a significant 
sustainability  surplus,  amounting  to  almost  80%  of  GDP.  Translated  into  FGB,  a 
representative of the future generations born one year after the base year is considerably 
better  off  than  its  counterpart  of  the  base  year  by  roughly  PLN  60,000.  Hence,  if for  all 
present generations the financing structure of the education system remains unchanged, we 
create a large intergenerational redistribution. But here it goes in a different direction: we are 
passing not a burden but an asset to future generations.  
Figure 64: FGB for education, 2007, in thousand PLN, r=3%, g=1,5% 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
  
                                            
84 Different authors such as Barro (2001) indicate that a higher spending on education can generate significant 
productivity gains and growth effects. Furthermore, recent literature such as Leifels and Vatter (2010) underlines 
that future public finances can profit considerable from present spending on education. Here especially public 
health care and unemployment insurances benefit from the gains of education since they are generally not based 
on the principle of equivalence. Other social security systems like the pension system profit less from future 
productivity  gains  and  accompanying  income  increases.  The  rationale  is  clear:  higher  income,  i.e.  higher 


























5.  The sustainability analysis of the entire public finances 
This chapter illustrates the outcomes for the entire Polish general government. After having 
analyzed selected isolated sub-systems of the age-related categories of public finances, we 
follow  with  the  ‘big  picture’.  So,  are  Polish  public  finances  stable  in  the  long  term?  Can 
assets of one sub-system outweigh the liabilities of other public finance systems? With the 
following passages we intend to answer these questions. 
In the budgetary year 2007 a few important systemic reforms were continued, which could 
have an important influence on our long term projections. Some of them were already taken 
into account and described in the results of the isolated computations: 
•  disability contributions rate lowered in a few stages, 
•  ‘walking changeover’ of the old pension provision system into NDC-based pension 
scheme. 
Additionally to the above-mentioned processes, in 2009 new personal income tax rates were 
introduced: instead of steeply progressing three rates of 19%, 30% and 40%, two new rates 
were introduced: 18% and 32%. Due to the timeline of computations of the current version of 
the GA, the consequences of tax rate changes were introduced only into the computations in 
the form of reduced aggregated revenues – based on the preliminary state budget reports on 
tax revenues from 2009.
85 Finally, interest payments and EU flows were excluded from the 
dataset, accordingly to the standard methodology of the GA. 
The effects of the business cycle were not taken into consideration. The reason for the lack 
of smoothened cyclical budgetary items in our computations is the quality of micro-profiles as 
well as the inconsistency of assumptions between the GA model and the available data on 
the cyclically adjusted deficit.
86 For taxes and unemployment benefits we used the most up-
to-date  aggregate  data  from  the  year  2009.  In  this  year  one  can  already  observe  the 
economic downturn in the budget data. Therefore, we might overestimate the fiscal gap by 
projecting 2009 data into the future without a smoothening of the business cycle. The authors 
decided to postpone the adjustment of the dataset to business cycle until an update of the 
paper.  
5.1. Generational Accounts for Poland 
Figure 65 shows GAs for Poland. The sinusoidal shape
87 of the chart is comparable to other 
(GA)  country  studies.  Each  column  presents  the  net  financial  position  of  the  respective 
                                            
85  Input  data  on  PIT  micro-profiles  from  the  base  year  are  left  unchanged.  Some  less  important  changes 
introduced in taxation system (VAT, excise, etc.) took place, but these were taken into consideration in the form of 
the aggregates for 2009, while their profiles remained unchanged. In order to adjust the dataset to the recent 
development of the fiscal situation, the whole set of 2008 aggregates and selected items for 2009 were introduced 
to the inputs. Therefore, the micro-profiles for: PIT, VAT, social contributions and all types of pension benefits 
paid by ZUS were rescaled to the 2009 preliminary aggregates. 
86 From the perspective of model inputs, the micro-profiles for taxes and unemployment benefits were created on 
the basis of statistical surveys, which miss the precision of ‘raw’ source data. These ‘raw’ data were derived from 
only slightly modified aggregation of accounting figures, provided by e.g. ZUS or KRUS. Secondly, the available 
data on cyclically adjusted deficit for Poland (NBP estimates) were based on different economic assumptions on 
the growth forecast in the coming years, higher and volatile comparing to our flat 1,5% in real terms. Facing the 
serious  risk  of  having  misleading  results,  the  authors  decided  to  postpone  the  adjustment  of  the  dataset  to 
business cycle until an update of the paper. 
87 The shape results from the expected economic activity of the individuals. Young cohorts of working population 
have yet many years of job activity, whilst the elderly part of the society has mainly retirement periods ahead. An 
additional factor, which plays a role is the discount factor. 93 
 
cohort.  In  other  words,  it  considers  all  fiscal  contributions  and  taxes  paid  as  well  as  all 
transfers  received  from  the  general  government  of  an  average  individual  over  his/her 
remaining  lifecycle.
88  The  youngest  cohorts  here  are  net  recipients.  In  other  words,  a 
newborn  Pole  gets  more  benefits  (over  his/her  remaining  lifecycle)  than  he/she  pays 
contributions  and  taxes.  For  each  subsequent  cohort  the  expected  cost/benefit  structure 
changes. The generation, which (in net terms) contributes the most (over its remaining life 
cycle) is aged 25 in 2007. The turning point, where the tax and contribution payments are 
balanced by transfers received, is recorded for the age group of 40 year olds. “Top (net) 
beneficiaries” are persons aged 55 to 60. Their present value of net transfers to be received 
amounted in 2007 to nearly PLN 280,000. It is important to stress that the GAs between 
cohorts – shown in Figure 65– are not comparable, since each following cohort, starting from 
the base year newborns, has a shorter remaining lifetime. In other words, only in the case of 
the zero year old the entire (expected) life cycle is taken into account. 
Again, on its own the GAs do not indicate whether the fiscal system is in any good or bad 
shape.  Only  when  weighting  the  GAs  with  the  demographic  structure  one  can  draw 
conclusions about the long-term stability of public finances. This further step is taken in the 
following passages. 
Figure 65: Generational Accounts for Poland, g=1.5%, r=3.0%, 2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
5.2. Fiscal gaps and sustainability indicators for Poland 
In the following chapter it will become clear that the explicit debt of 45% in the base year is 
only the “top of the iceberg” of the Polish government debts. In fact, the current fiscal policy 
bears an additional implicit debt of about four times the explicit debt of the base year GDP 
(183%).  This  amount  is  generated  when  weighting  the  GAs  of  present
89  and  future 
generations  with  the  respective  cohort  sizes.
90  Overall  the  sustainability  gap  of  Poland 
                                            
88 All GAs are stated in present value. 
89 See Figure 65. 















































amounts  to  228%  of  GDP  in  2007  –  including  the  explicit  and  the  implicit  debt
91.  The 
message is clear and could have been somehow expected after a series of adverse results 
for isolated subsystems: Polish public finances are not sustainable. Even after the profound 
reform measures of recent years the fiscal system cannot be continued in the long run and 
certainly further reforms are needed in the light of a rapidly ageing society.  
Of course, the results are accompanied with a considerable amount of uncertainty, especially 
regarding the growth and discount rate but also concerning the demographic development. 
Nevertheless,  the  sensitivity  analysis  indicates  that  the  qualitative  conclusion  does  not 
change if reasonably different presumptions are taken (see chapter 6.1). Also in these cases 
the present Polish fiscal policy is not sustainable. 
Figure 66: Sustainability gap for Poland, g=1,5%, r=3,0%, 2007, % of GDP 
 
Source: own calculations 
An indicator illustrating the intergenerational burden is the FGB. We will recall that it shows 
the unfunded burden to be carried by future newborns. With this indicator we assume that 
the sustainability gap (see Figure 66) is closed only by future generations – born after the 
base year. The column of the “-1 year old” is a representative of these future generations. In 
comparison to the “0 year old” it outlines the intergenerational redistribution. In the case of 
Poland  a  newborn  after  the  base  year  has  to  bear  an  additional  fiscal  burden  of  about 
PLN180,000.
92 In other words, this future newborn would have to pay PLN 180,000 more 
than the “zero year old” over his remaining life cycle in order to close the sustainability gap. 
                                            
91 Since our study is the first to analyze the sustainability of Polish public finances with the method of GA, the 
comparability with other studies is possible only to a small extent. The cross country comparison is also difficult. 
While the 2007 base year applied in our case is relatively ‘fresh’ (2007), available studies for other countries end 
up at updates for the base year 2005. In a future update of this study we would like to give such a cross country 
comparison which could base on preliminary work of the RCG, see e.g. Hagist et al. (2009) or Moog et al. (2010). 
92 This number is simply derived by subtracting the Generational Account of the „zero year old“ (-55,000 PLN) 






228,1% of GDP95 
 
Figure 67: Future Generations’ Burden for Poland, g=1,5%, r=3,0%, 2007, in thousand PLN 
 
Source: own calculations 
A further indicator, the revenue gap gives an answer to which extent an increase in taxes 
and other revenues can close the sustainability gap. In the case of Poland in 2007, revenues 
(for present and future generations) needed to be increased considerably by 12% in order to 
guarantee a sustainable fiscal policy. The other final indicator to be analyzed is the transfer 
gap. It shows to which extent general government transfers should be trimmed to close the 
sustainability gap. According to our estimates, benefits (of present and future generations) 
have to be reduced by 11% to close the sustainability gap. Also these indicators illustrate 
that there is a need for fiscal changes to stabilize Polish public finances in the long term.  
The sustainability gaps of isolated sub-systems give a better picture of the main drivers for 
the Polish overall implicit debt. The gaps for our standard isolation approach are illustrated in 
Figure 68. Looking at this chart, first of all, its interpretation should be made clear. These 
gaps were elaborated with the assumption of a lack of external financing (only own resources 
on the revenue side). In other words, e.g. in the case of ZUS only pension contributions paid 
and pension benefits received have been considered. The significant amount of tax inflow 
into ZUS in the base year has not been taken into account. We shall therefore start the 
discussion of the results in Figure 68 with the systems which depend in the base year to a 
large  extent  on  external  financing:  ZUS,  farmers  and  miners.
93  For  these  systems  the 
isolated gaps indicate that they will also depend heavily on tax inflows in the future – if no 
major reform steps are taken.  
In the case of the ZUS old age pension system the considerable mismatch of contributions 
and expenditures in the coming decades bears a challenge for the Polish fiscal policy. These 
transformation costs of the 1999 reform – described more closely in chapter 4.1 – explain 
mainly the large sustainability gap of ca. the base year GDP. It should be underlined here 
that  in  the  long  run  –  as  showed  in  chapter  4.1.2.5  –  contributions  can  almost  cover 
expenditures in the ZUS pension system.  
                                            














































In  the  case  of  famers  and  miners,  these  fiscal  systems  would  generate  a  significant 
sustainability gap if external financing were not to be prolonged in the future. The farmers 
system would accumulate a sustainability gap of 41% and the miners system of 16% of the 
base year GDP. The message from this exercise is that despite assumed future shrinking of 
the miners and farmers sectors also in the coming decades their entitlements have to be 
financed to a large degree by tax inflows.  
Figure 68: Isolated Sustainability Gaps of the parafiscal and other subsystems  
– standard isolation approach – 
 
    Source: own calculations 
What becomes clear in Figure 68 is that especially the health care and disability system 
“contribute” to the long-term instability of Polish public finances. If we project the contribution 
and  expenditure  structure  of  the  base  year  into  the  future  the  disability  system  would 
generate a sustainability gap of nearly 100% of GDP. We will see later that this isolated gap 
is mainly caused by the deficit in the base year. For the health care system the implicit debt 
amounts to about 80% of GDP. Here it should be noted that the latter system is based on 
relatively conservative assumptions. In the case of the so called cost pressure scenario the 
public health care system could even turn out be the most unsustainable of all systems (see 
chapter 4.5). Only the isolated sickness insurance fund and education system can generate 
a  wealth  over  the  coming  decades.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the  future  decrease  of  their 
beneficiaries.  Most  benefits  of  the  sickness  fund  are  paid  out  to  the  shrinking  working 
population,  and  with  dropping  fertility  rates  current  spending  for  pupils  will  become 
exaggerated from a purely accounting point of view. 
Projecting the residual of all other parts of Polish public finances into the future would imply a 
significant implicit wealth of about 160% of the base year GDP – see bar ‘all others’. This 
stems mainly from the fact that in the standard isolation approach we did not consider any 
tax inflows. This significant amount of tax revenues – reflected in the column ‘all others’ – is 
more than enough to cover the expenses of the residual parts of public finances. Of course, 
policy  makers  in  the  future  can  decide  how  to  use  this  tax  money,  e.g.  to  cover  the 
transformation  costs  of  the  pension  system  or  to  finance  the  increasing  health  care 

























tax inflows will not be sufficient to cover the sum of all isolated sustainability gaps. Summing 
up  all  isolations  given  in  Figure  68  the  overall  implicit  sustainability  gap  of  Polish  public 
finances still amounts to about 180% of the base year GDP. 
At present some fiscal systems are financed to a large degree by the state budget. So the 
crucial  question  is  whether  we  should  project  this  tax  inflow,  too,  when  isolating  the 
respective fiscal system into the future. According to the legal rules of the status quo there is 
no  binding  and  clear  rule  that  deficits  shall  always  be  covered  by  the  state  budget.
94 
Therefore, we do not include tax inflow, and any other form of additional financing in the 
standard isolation scenario. But is this a politically realistic scenario? Most probably, also in 
future budgetary years one will observe large tax inflows into ZUS and other fiscal subsystem 
such as the farmers and miners system. Therefore, we apply a second isolation approach in 
the following Figure 69. Whilst Figure 68 is based on the ‘pure’ own resources principle, 
Figure 69 assumes a balanced cash budget in the base year for each isolated subsystem. In 
other words we disregard the mismatch of contributions and expenditures in the base year in 
the balanced  budget  approach. It  may  be  worthwhile  adding  that  in  such  a  scenario the 
revenue side consists of two separately developed profiles: already analysed own resources 
profile with the specific structure of contributors and their contributions. The other part of the 
revenue  side,  so  to  say  the  compensating  part  that  simply  balances  in  cash  terms  the 
isolated subsystem in a base year, consists of a flat per capita population profile, as in the 
case of civil servants or education. This second part holds its residual value only in the base 
year, as later on it lives its own ‘life’, independent of the development of actual deficit or 
surplus stemming from the difference between age and gender specific own resources and 
expenditures. The aim of this scenario is first of all to examine whether the present additional 
(compensating) revenue inflow will also be required in the long term. E.g. in the case of 
miners we intend to analyse whether the present tax inflow will be sufficient to guarantee the 
fiscal long term stability of the miners’ social security system. Of course, also in the balanced 
budget approach reforms as well as the ageing process and transformation specific trends 
are taken into account. The factor which is knowingly neglected is the respective base year 
deficit of the sub-system analyzed.  
The balanced budget scenario also suits another aim. It helps to make the outcomes for the 
civil  servants’  social  assistance  system  as  well  as  education  system  (methodologically) 
comparable with other systems which rely on  primarily own resources. As pointed out in 
chapter  3  these  two  systems,  the  education  and  the civil  servants  system,  are  the  only 
isolated  fiscal  entities  which  are  financed  solely  by  taxes  and  not  own  contributions. 
Therefore,  for  these  ‘special’  schemes  it  is  only  feasible  to  apply  the  balanced  budget 
approach.  
                                            
94 E.g. in the case of ZUS the deficit can also be covered from other sources: short term loans from the banks or 
expected one-off capital injections from the Demographic Reserve Fund. 98 
 
Figure 69: Isolated Sustainability Gaps of the parafiscal and other subsystems (in balanced 
cash budget scenario) 
 
Source: own calculations 
It  is  interesting that  in  the  case  of  old  age  pensions  paid  by  ZUS  the  assumption  of  an 
unchanged  level  of  external  support  transforms  the  ZUS  sustainability  gap  into  implicit 
wealth. This confirms to some extent our suggestions from the chapter devoted to NDC cash 
flows: in the coming decades ZUS will have to bear the double burden of 1) phasing out the 
generous old system and 2) additionally lowering the contribution basis (from 19.52 % to 
12.22  %).  However,  after  this  unpleasant  transformation  period  contributions  can  almost 
match expenditures. In other words, after the year 2028 the government supports for ZUS 
can be most probably gradually reduced. So, as assumed in Figure 69, ZUS would generate 
a considerable wealth of about 50% of the base year GDP. 
If policy makers decided to keep the large financial support to miners from the base year, the 
virtual miners’ subsystem would be almost balanced over time despite the ageing process. 
We explain this sustainability improvement by the gradually decreasing number of working 
miners. On the one hand the present per capita tax inflow into the miners social security 
system is not needed since there will be simply fewer participants in this sector. However, on 
the other hand this trend cannot totally outweigh the increasing burden of the ageing process 
– we still have some (though relatively slight) instability in the long term. 
In the case of the healthcare system, which is almost balanced in cash terms in the base 
year – but for a relatively small part of missing contributions paid by certain groups, like 
farmers – the lack of stability remains almost unchanged. The drop of around 10 percentage 
points does not firmly improve the poor financial prospect of the healthcare system. We shall 
recall here a very probable cost pressure scenario, which doubles the expected implicit fiscal 
burden of the public health care system. 
Contrary to the healthcare system, the disability fund can substantially improve its long term 
stability in the case of the balanced budget scenario – by 60pp. of the base year GDP. This 
stems from the fact that the disability fund showed a significant deficit in the base year. Of 

























stability of this system improves. Nevertheless, still a considerable sustainability gap of 32% 
of the base year GDP remains.  
Furthermore, we can see that, if the government support to farmers remained unchanged, 
the fund would indeed significantly gain stability. In other words, with the gradual outflow of 
farmers from this system, the present government support would be more than sufficient in 
the long term.  
Civil servants social benefits’ scheme and education were already based in the first place on 
the assumption of a balanced ‘own’ budget in the base year (for an explanation see the 
respective chapters). The sustainability gap of civil servants ‘fund’ is relatively remarkable 
considering its low share of overall government expenditures in the base year (about 2.5%). 
The perspective of the education system turns out to be relatively promising. Contrary to the 
other  system  it  can  generate  a  remarkable  “demographic  dividend”  due  to  the  ageing 
process. More precisely, the expected low fertility rates, which translate into fewer pupils, will 
generate considerable accounting savings in the future. 
Coming to a conclusion, a closer look on the isolated fiscal systems has shown that the 
stability  of  the  subsystems  of  public  finances  is  relatively  heterogeneous.  Especially  the 
health care system but also the disability system turns out to be rather unsustainable. In the 
standard isolation approach we do not consider external financing such as taxes since the 
legal status quo gives no rules to project these extra revenues. If we however, deviated from 
this approach and gave as a reference the balanced budget scenario further information can 
be derived about future public finances. On this basis we could e.g. show that the present 
values of tax inflow into the education system but also into the general pension system will 
not be required in the long run.  
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6.  Conclusions and outlook 
In the coming decades Poland will be severely confronted by an ageing population. No other 
EU  country  (except  Slovakia)  will  experience  such  a  rapid  rise  of  the  number  of  elderly 
people relative to the working population. With this study we aimed to assess the impact of 
this ageing process on the long term stability of Polish public finances. Within this context we 
wanted to address the question whether recent fiscal reforms – and in particular the profound 
pension reform of 1999 – are sufficient to prepare Polish public finances for the upcoming 
ageing process. In comparison to other GA studies we, furthermore, aimed to focus on a 
special  characteristic  of  the  Polish  economy:  the  ongoing  transformation  process.  When 
analyzing the fiscal system of Poland one has to bear in mind that the past shrinking of the 
farming and mining sector can be most probably also observed in the coming decades. We, 
therefore, tried to comprise such transformation specific features into our computations.  
Looking at the overall fiscal system the results are clear cut: Polish public finances are not 
sufficiently  prepared  for  the  upcoming  ageing  process.  If  the  present  fiscal  policy  were 
prolonged into the future considerable debts would be accumulated. Due to our calculations 
the fiscal gap of the entire public finances amounts to 228% of GDP (in 2007). This number 
can be interpreted as the amount which would have to be set aside today in order to sustain 
the present fiscal policy in the future. Of course, one can argue that this outcome is rather 
sensitive to the chosen assumptions: mainly the discount and the growth rate as well as 
demographic  presumptions.  The  authors  are,  therefore,  very  open  to  a  debate  on  the 
quantitative  results.  Nevertheless,  though  one  might  twist  and  turn  the  (reasonable) 
assumptions, the qualitative statement remains the same: present Polish fiscal policy is not 
sustainable. 
A closer look on subsystems is highly valuable. It illustrates which fiscal systems are the 
main drivers of the unsustainability of public finances and which systems are prepared for the 
upcoming ageing process. We started our analysis with the general pension system – the 
biggest item of Polish public finances. Due to our calculations the comprehensive pension 
reform of 1999 remarkably improved the fiscal long term stability. The virtue of the new NDC 
system – in terms of sustainability – is that it automatically adjusts pension benefits to the 
future demographic development. On the basis of the 1999 reform future expenditures can 
be almost entirely covered by future contributions. However, this statement only holds in the 
(very) long-term! The challenge for policy makers lies in the coming 20 years. In this period 
the increase of total pension expenditures will be considerably higher than the growth of 
pension contributions leading to an increasing deficit of ZUS until 2030. The reason for this 
development lies in the “quadruple burden”: 1) high pension entitlements of the old generous 
pension system 2) for an increasing number of elderly people have to be paid by 3) lowered 
contributions of a 4) decreasing number of contributors. In other words, ZUS will require a 
considerable and increasing amount of additional inflows in the nearer future. How these 
financing gaps of future budgetary years are bridged – it has to be decided by politicians. In 
the course of the intended accession to the euro area a further considerable extension of tax 
inflows into ZUS is probably not desired by policy makers. Against this background our study 
quantified the impact of two recently discussed reform proposals: 1) an increase of female 
retirement age and 2) a partial switch of pension contributions from the funded (FDC) to the 
unfunded  pension  scheme  (NDC).  We  demonstrated  that  these  reform  measures  can 
partially bridge the cash deficits in the coming decades.  
One major driver of the long term fiscal system could play a key role in the instability of the 
public health care system. According to our estimates – which differ to some extent from the 101 
 
Ageing  Working  Group  –  future  health  care  expenditures  in  Poland  will  rise  rather 
considerably  due  to  the  rapid  ageing  process.  The  results  are  even  more  serious  when 
considering the so called medical technical progress. In order to bridge these expenditures 
contribution rates would have to rise from the present 9% to 15% (20%) until the year 2050 in 
the standard scenario (in the medical technical progress scenario). Against this background 
policy makers will have to choose in the coming decades between an increase in health care 
revenues – via higher contribution rates and/or extra budget funding – and/or a cut in health 
expenditures to close arising fiscal gaps. 
Also the fiscal sustainability of the disability fund is questionable in the long run. This is to 
some extent caused by a cut in contribution rates which led to a significant deficit in 2009. 
Yet, not only the weak revenue side could cause a future financing gap but also the increase 
of future expenditures – namely of survivors’ pensions. However, regarding the disability fund 
it should be underlined that our computations are limited. Due to data constraints not all 
aspects of the 2006 reform have been considered.  
Remarkable  is  the  influence  of  the  expected  transformation  process  on  the  Polish  fiscal 
sustainability.  Based  on  national  estimates  we  aimed  to  project  a  further  outflow  of 
contributors from the farmers’ and miners’ social insurance systems into the general social 
security  system  –  namely  ZUS.  According  to  our  computations  this  transformation  will 
improve the long-term stability of the overall public finances. The explanation lies, simply 
speaking,  in  a  relative  sustainability  of  the  general  social  security  systems  vis  a  vis  the 
farmers (miners) system. In the coming decades a higher proportion of the population will be 
insured in the relatively more sustainable ZUS system and fewer citizens will participate in 
the relatively unstable KRUS (miners) system. 
A fiscal system which can generate a significant wealth in the future – assuming constant per 
capita  expenditures  –  is  the  education  system.  It  is  the  only  subsystem  –  besides  the 
insurance  fund  for  accident  at  work  –  which  can  considerably  profit  from  the  expected 
demographic ageing, namely from the low fertility rates, which translate into a decrease in 
the number of pupils. The interesting question of the coming years will be therefore how will 
politicians  spend  this  “demographic  dividend”,  on  an  increase  of  (per  capita)  education 
expenditures or covering the deficits of other fiscal systems?  
The authors are well aware that this first GA-sustainability study can only give a first picture 
of  future  public  finances  in  Poland  and  there  are  certainly  further  possibilities  for 
improvements of our computations.  
As in every projection the quality and availability of data is vital to the accuracy of results. 
While for e.g. pension expenditures the available data were very satisfactory, this statement 
does not hold for various tax categories such as CIT and real estate taxes. Future research 
should therefore try to gather more precise age- and gender-specific micro data on these 
important parts of government revenues.
95 Generally, various occupation groups showed in 
recent decades waves of employment. As a result, the population of these professions – like 
e.g. civil servants – does not follow the general population structure. Due to a lack of data we 
could  not  take  this  into  account  for  teachers  and  civil  servants.  Future  research  could, 
therefore, be based on actual sub-populations in order to generate more precise results. In 
this  context  also  occupation  specific  life  tables  could  be  applied.  A  further  improvement 
                                            
95 We also still lack precision of numerous smaller revenue parts of government finances like contributions for the 
Labour Fund (in fact unemployment contributions). Additionally, farmers’ social insurance could be more exactly 
reflected in our computations with additional data on the possible income structure per cohort. This would allow 
more exact forecasts on e.g. the contribution inflows from richer farmers. 102 
 
concerns  the  quality  and  availability  of  income  profiles.  For  some  professions  such  as 
teachers and farmers additional information on the income structure per cohort would allow 
more exact forecasts. In this context also the deviation of the income profiles created on the 
basis of data provided by ZUS from respective data based on the household survey (2006) 
should be further examined.  
In  the  course  of  this  study  we  focused  on  the  reformed  ZUS  pensions  system  and  the 
ongoing  transformation  process.  Future  research  could  examine  some  other  features  of 
government finances in greater detail. We would e.g. propose to analyze more thoroughly 
the impact of the profound disability reform of the year 2006. On the basis of ‘fresher’ micro 
data – which encompasses a more detailed account of the effects of this reform – we could 
considerably improve our estimations for this scheme of public finances. Future research 
could also put a stronger emphasis on the public health care system – which according to 
our  outcomes  is  a  major  driver  of  the  unsustainability.  Since  our  study  diverges  from 
AWG2009 health results we would strongly recommend a closer comparison and exchange 
with the AWG, especially on the data applied but also on the assumptions and methodology. 
In 2007 only 0.6% of elderly people (aged 60+) have been cared for in nursing homes in 
Poland.  Other  EU-countries  such  as  Sweden  (7.2%),  Netherlands  (5%)  or  Spain  (3.4) 
showed significantly higher levels. Further research could, therefore, also examine the fiscal 
impact of a possible rise of in-patient care to the EU-average. The core of our study was to 
analyze the effects of the ageing process on Polish public finances, employment trends have 
only been partially considered. Future studies could focus more on the future labour market, 
e.g. on the impact of higher female participation rates on different social security systems. 
As outlined above our computations can clearly be improved further and extended in various 
directions. Against this background, we hope that this initial GA study for Poland will be a 
valuable fundament for discussion and further research.  
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Appendix 1: Sensitivity Analysis
 
 
Next, the sensitivity analysis of our results is presented in Figure 70 and Figure 71:  
Figure 70: Demographic sensitivity analysis for the sustainability gap of the entire Polish 
public finances, 2007, g=1.5%, r=3% 
 
Source: own calculations 
As plotted in Figure 70 the sensitivity analysis shows little elasticity of the sustainability gap 
to changing migration, life expectancy or fertility rate assumptions. The assumptions taken in 
these scenarios are described in detail in chapter 3.2.1. Most significant changes can be 
observed if the discount rate is changed. It also becomes clear that in fact the differential 
between the discount and the growth rate has the biggest influence on the results – see 
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Figure 71: Sensitivity analysis of the growth and discount rate for the sustainability gap of the 
entire Polish public finances, 2007, g=1.5%, r=3% 
 
 



























Appendix 2: Applied micro profiles 
   
 
 
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
NDC pension contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
Miners' pension contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
ZUS disability contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
ZUS accident at work insurance contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
ZUS sickness insurance contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
Farmers' pension and disability contributions
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
PIT work
Men Women






0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
VAT
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
Excise tax
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
Healthcare contributions work
Men Women
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 
Healthcare contributions pensions
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